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Abstract 
This study investigates the role of the land rental market in rural 
economic development with the province Chongqing, China, as 
case study region. The study focuses on the question 
participation in the land rental market can improve agricultural 
production efficiency and alleviate income inequality in rural areas. 
Finally, the factors that affect rental market participation of farm 
households are examined. 
 
A stochastic frontier approach was employed to measure effect of 
the land rental market participation on agricultural productivity. 
Two competing hypotheses are tested: 1) Less efficient farm 
households rent out land to more efficient farm households and 
agricultural productivity is improved; 2) More efficient farm 
households rent out land and work off of farm, which results in 
lower agricultural productivity. The results showed that both of 
these hypotheses are possibly true, but more efficient farm 
households are more likely to rent land rather than rent it out, 
which implies the productivity enhancive effect of land rental 
market.  
 
To investigate the impact of land rental market development on 
rural income distribution, firstly the income inequality was 
decomposed to measure the contribution of land rental income to 
total income inequality and the interactions between land rental 
income and other income sources. Then, relying on the inequality 
index calculated, a fixed effect model was used to investigate the 
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impact of participation in the land rental market and land rental 
market imperfection on income inequality index. The results 
showed that contribution of land rental income to total income 
inequality is increasing over the observation period. And 
participation in land rental market may reduce income inequality, 
given an imperfect land rental market.  
 
Deriving from a farm household model, farm households’ supply 
and demand decisions in land rental market were explored. The 
multinomial Logit model is used to examine factors that influence 
farm household participation probability in the land rental market. 
Furthermore, Tobit models are employed to measure the impact 
on the quantity of renting and renting out by farm households. 
Results from these two models show the importance of off-farm 
work wage and off-farm labor market imperfection in defining the 
rental behavior of farm households: it prevents farm households 
from renting land and encourage them to rent out. Simulation 
results show that rising off-farm work wages and participation rate 
in the off-farm labor market lead to a lower equilibrium land rent in 
a closed economy. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Rolle von 
Landpachtmärkten für die ländliche Entwicklung mithilfe in 
Chonqing (China). Gegenstand der Untersuchung ist, inwieweit 
die Teilnahme an Landpachtmärkten die landwirtschaftliche 
Produktionseffizienz verbessert und Einkommensungleichheiten 
in ländlichen Regionen reduziert. Zudem werden Einflussfaktoren 
für die Teilnahme an Landpachtmärkten untersucht.  
 
Um den Effekt der Teilnahme an Landpachtmärkten auf 
landwirtschaftliche Produktivität abzuschätzen, wird ein, 
Stochastik Frontier“ – Verfahren angewendet. Zwei verschiedene 
Hypothesen werden getestet: 1) Weniger effiziente 
Farmhaushalte verpachten Land an effizientere Farmhaushalte, 
so dass die landwirtschaftliche Produktivität steigt; 2) Effizientere 
Farmhaushalte verpachten Land und arbeiten außerhalb des 
landwirtschaftlichen Sektros, was zu geringerer Produktivität führt. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass möglicherweise beide Hypothesen 
stimmen, jedoch haben effizientere Farmhaushalte eine höhere 
Wahrscheinlichkeit Land zu pachten als zu verpachten, so dass 
insgesamt eine Produktivitätssteigerung erwartet werden kann.  
 
Zur Untersuchung des Einflusses der Entwicklung von 
Landpachtmärkten auf die ländliche Einkommensverteilung 
wurde eine Dekomposition der Einkommensungleichheit 
vorgenommen, um den Beitrag von Landpachtmärkten auf die 
gesamete Einkommensungleichheit und Interaktionen zwischen 
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Einkommen aus der Landverpachtung und anderen Quellen zu 
vergleichen. Basierend auf dem errchneten Ungleichheitsindex 
wird eine Regressionsanalyse durchgeführt, um den Einfluss der 
Teilnahme an Landpachtmärkten und der Unvollkommenheit 
dieser Märkte auf den Einkommensungleichheitsindex zu 
untersuchen. Die Ergehnisse zeigen, dass während des 
untersuchten Zeitraums Einkommen aus Landverpachtung zur 
Einkommensungleichheit beigetragen hat. Aufgrund der 
Unvollkommenheit des Marktes scheint die Teilnahme an 
Landpachtmärkten Einkommensungleichheiten zu verschärfen. 
 
Von einem Farmhaushaltsmodell ausgehend werden die 
Angebots- und Nachfrageentscheidungen empirisch untersucht. 
Ein multinomiales Logitmodell wird genutzt, um die Faktoren zu 
finden, dei die Wahrscheinlichkeit beeinflussen, mit der ein 
Farmhaushalt entscheidet am Landverpachtungsmarkt 
teilzunehmen. Außerdem werden Tobitmodelle genutzt, um die 
Auswirkungen der Pacht und Verpachtung von Land zu 
analysieren. Die Resultate dieser beiden Modelle zeigen, dass 
Lohn für Arbeit außerhalb der Farm und Unvollkommenheiten von 
Arbeitsmärkten außerhalb der Farm das Pachtverhalten von 
Farmhaushalten beeinflussen. Steigende nicht-landwirtschaftliche 
Löhne und die Teilnahme an Arbeitsmärkten außerhalb der 
Landwirtschaft führen zu einem niedrigeren Gleichgewichtspreis 
für die Pachtung von Land. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and background 
1.1 Research background 
1.1.1 Land rental market development in China 
Over the last thirty years, China has experienced an evolutionary 
economic and social transformation while moving toward a 
market-oriented economy. This process is accompanied by the 
land policy reform to improve land use efficiency. In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the household responsibility system 
(HRS) was established which would become the most 
fundamental change of land institution since the Opening Up. 
Under the HRS, farm households rent land from collectives and 
have the responsibility to deliver grain quota to the local 
government below market price. Even though land ownership 
was still held by village collectives, the usufruct of land and 
residual claim rights were granted to farm households
1
. Along 
with a series of reforms of output and input markets, the 
introduction of the HRS significantly promoted agricultural output 
growth (McMillan et al., 1989; Lin, 1992). However, despite these 
positive results, the HRS was often thought to be unacceptable 
due to its alleged incompatibility with the prevailing ideology at 
that time (Lin, 1987; Du, 2006). Therefore, the Central Committee 
                                                             
1
 Before 1978, agriculture was operated by collectives and peasants were 
employees of these farm collectives.  
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issued a series of policies to ensure the implementation of the 
HRS. Towards the end of 1983, the HRS covered 94.2% of farm 
households (Lin, 1987). 
 
According to Document No.1 issued by the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of China in 1982, under the HRS farm 
households obtained a certain area of collectively owned land 
based on family labor, the family dependent ratio and/or 
agricultural ability of family labor. But in practice, most villages 
distributed land plots equally among all families. This equality not 
only reflected in plot size, but also in the quality of land, which 
means each household would take equal acreage of poor and 
good cultivated land. This egalitarian distribution of land is the 
major reason for land fragmentation in China (Tan et al., 2006). A 
survey of 280 villages conducted by the former Rural 
Development Research Center (RDRC) under the State Council 
in 1986 indicated that the land per farm household ratio was 9.2 
mu (or 0.61 ha, 1 hectare = 15 mu) which was divided into on 
average 9plots. 
 
Surprisingly, it was not before 1986 when the HRS was 
legitimatized with the Land Management Law being amended to 
include the HRS as a legal land institution. Later, in 1988, the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was amended to 
permit that the use right of land can be transferred between farm 
households. Legalization of land rental has negligible impact on 
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the development of the land rental market, despite China’s major 
transformation from a planned economy to a market economy. In 
1995, less than three percent of all land was rented out (Turner, 
et.al, 1998). 
 
A wide range of literature investigates why the land rental market 
developed so slowly in this period. A scarcity in off-farm work 
(Kung, 2002; Tu et al., 2006), legal insecurity concerning land use 
(Yang, 1997; Lohmar et al., 2001), and grain quotas (Lohmar et 
al., 2000) are considered as the major obstacles to land rental 
market development. Without off-farm work, rural labor can only 
engage in agricultural production and with very low land labor 
ratio, we can expect that the supply side of the land rental market 
is short. The effect between land rental market development and 
the farm labor market could be mutual. Zhao (1999) pointed out 
that a slack land rental market discourages labor migration from 
rural to urban area. Moreover, rent-out land could be regarded as 
a signal that a farm household no longer needs land, which can 
cause the land be taken back or lead less land being assigned in 
next round of administrative reallocation to the farm household 
(Yang, 1997). This argument was initially claimed by Yang (1997). 
This threat to tenure security was curtailed with new policies 
which focused on promoting land rental instead of controlling 
every aspect of it.  
 
In this context, the impact of grain quotas should not be 
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underestimated, as grain quotas reduce the return on land, land 
rental transactions in the market equilibrium with quotas must be 
lower than in the market equilibrium without grain quotas. 
Empirical evidence has shown that land rental activity is higher in 
villages with low grain quotas (Lohmar et al., 2001).  
 
The duration of the first round of land contracts between farm 
households and village collectives was 15 years, officially from 
1983 to 1997. Farm households can extend their contract with 
collectives to another 30 years after expiration of the first round of 
land contracts. The administrative land reallocation has been 
decreasing since the second round of land contracts between 
farm households and village collectives (Tao et al., 2009). 
 
In 2003, the Rural Land Contract Law was introduced to secure 
the contract right of farm households and reduce arbitrarily 
administrative land reallocation by village cadres. One chapter of 
this law focuses on land rental activity between farm households, 
in order to regulate land rental market and protect the rights of 
“landlord” and “tenant”. Another meaningful change was the 
cancellation of nation-wide grain quotas in 2006, which should 
have a positive impact on the development of the land rental 
market. Meanwhile, off-farm work opportunities are thriving. 
Hundreds of millions of agricultural laborers moved to newly 
developed non-agricultural industries. Benefitting from all these 
positive changes, the land rental market was promoted in recent 
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years. The ratio of rented land area to total arable land increased 
from 5.2 per cent in 2007 to 16.2 per cent in 2011.  
 
By now, farm households in China enjoy a relative secure land 
contract right. This security is only relative as there is no 
protection against state expropriation. By Land Administration 
Law, the central government and its local authorities have the 
exclusive right to change the land use type. Before any 
development on the agricultural land, land ownership has to 
change from collectively owned to state owned. The state, or 
government, will compensate the farm households whose land 
was expropriated based on the yield of this land. Then the 
government rents out this land through an auction, or by other 
ways and land rent is determined by what will be developed on 
the land. This process brings about enormous revenues 
constituting strong incentive to the local government to 
expropriate land from farm households for development use, 
especially for real estate. This is the major threat to the land 
contract right of farm households. Because location is one of the 
factors which determine the development value of land, land in 
underdeveloped regions (far away from any city or arterial road) 
is less likely to be affected by state expropriation (Deininger et al., 
2004). Therefore, for farm households in these remote regions, 
land contract rights enjoy a much higher degree of security.  
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1.1.2 Rural economic development in Chongqing 
Chongqing, in Southwest China, is a municipality which is directly 
controlled by the central government. Of its total population of 
29.45 million in 2012, 43% lived in rural areas, compared to 64.4% 
in 2000. Contribution of agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) 
was declining from 15.9% in 2000 to 8.2% in 2012. Employment 
in the agricultural sector decreased also, from 55.4% in 2000 to 
36.3% in 2012
2
. 
Table 1.1 Share of income from each component to net 
income of rural households in Chongqing (%) 
 
Migration 
income 
local off-
farm 
income 
farming 
income 
husbandry 
income 
transfer 
income 
other 
income 
2003 22,00 22,29 31,31 15,18 6,18 3,03 
2004 23,46 17,28 33,42 17,78 5,05 3,01 
2005 25,37 18,20 33,93 14,63 5,28 2,59 
2006 29,55 22,04 28,05 11,11 6,51 2,74 
2007 29,37 20,16 26,64 13,53 7,59 2,70 
2008 27,90 20,49 26,67 15,52 7,13 2,30 
2009 27,32 21,73 26,07 13,40 8,47 3,00 
2010 27,21 23,12 25,27 11,11 10,00 3,30 
2011 25,33 25,75 22,03 13,02 10,77 3,10 
2012 25,71 26,74 22,23 10,37 11,26 3,68 
Data source: Calculated based on Chongqing Statistic Yearbook 2004-
2013.  
 
Structural changes to the economy diversified income sources of 
rural households. But agricultural income still accounts for a 
                                                             
2
Data source: Chongqing Statistic Yearbook 2013. 
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significant share of a households’ total income and is a reliable 
income source (see Table 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1 Gini index of rural Chongqing, 2004-2012 
 
 
 
 
Agricultural GDP increased at an annual rate of 3.4% from 1985 
to 2012. Accompanying this considerable growth were increases 
in sown area (0.3%), irrigation area (0.5%), agricultural machinery 
(6.4%), electricity utilization in agriculture (9.6%), fertilizer (4.2%), 
agricultural film (8.3%), and pesticides (3.8%). But agricultural 
labor declined 2% annually in the same period. This may imply a 
low agricultural total factor productivity growth
3
. Income 
distribution got worse in rural Chongqing. The Gini index of rural 
income distribution in Chongqing rose from 0.25 in 2004 to 0.33 
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in 2012
4
, as it is shown in Figure 1.1.  
1.2 Problem definition and research questions 
As the developing land rental market has efficiency and equity 
implications for rural economic development, we would like to 
investigate the following research questions:  
 
1. What factors affect farm household participation in the land 
rental market, especially in the context of increasing off-farm 
employment and rising off-farm work wages? 
 
2. Can participation in the land rental market improve agricultural 
production efficiency? 
 
3. Can participation in the land rental market alleviate income 
inequality in rural areas? 
 
4. After answering the first three research questions, we can then 
evaluate how land rental market development affects rural 
economic development, which mainly concentrates on off-farm 
labor market development, agricultural production efficiency, and 
income distribution. 
                                                             
4
Calculation based on the Chongqing Statistic Yearbook 2005-2013. Income 
data is net income per capita in rural Chongqing. Rural households were 
classified into five groups based on net income per capita. Only mean net 
income per capita data were reported in these yearbooks. However, these 
data could underestimate real income inequality in rural Chongqing.  
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5. We are, furthermore, interested in how the land tenure system 
has been evolving in China from the late 19
th
 century until today. 
In spite of radical changes over the last century, we can still find 
some clues indicating the evolvement of land tenancy and 
implications for future changes of the land rental market in China. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 examines the land rental market development from a 
historical perspective in order to provide deep insights on land 
institutional changes. Chapter 3 develops the analytical 
framework of this thesis. In Chapter 4, we use stochastic frontier 
analysis to analyze the effects of the land rental activities on 
agricultural production efficiency. The Bayesian procedure was 
used for the estimation. Chapter 5 investigates how income from 
land rental activities affects total income distribution in rural 
Chongqing. Correlations between income components and the 
land rental market environment are incorporated in this analysis. 
Chapter 6 studies factors that are relevant to the land rental 
market participation of farm households. Not only are we 
interested in the probability of participation; we are also trying to 
determine the supply and demand of land in the market. Finally in 
Chapter 7, we draw conclusions based on the extensive empirical 
research as presented in the previous chapters.  
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Chapter 2 Land rental market development in China: A 
historical review 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the late 19
th
 century, land market and land institutional 
changes in China can be divided into three stages. The first stage 
(from the late Qing Dynasty to the foundation of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949) featured a “free land market” (Zhang, 
1988a; Chao, 2006). In the first stage, land property rights, land 
ownership and use rights are privately owned. The land sale 
market coexisted with the land rental market where supply and 
demand law defined the market equilibrium. This free land market 
was deconstructed by the agricultural socialist transformation in 
China after 1949 when the second stage began
5
. In 1956, the 
government announced that this socialist transformation was 
completed. Afterwards, there was neither private land ownership 
nor a private land use right
6
. Arable land was owned by 
collectives, and agricultural production was conducted collectively. 
Thus, the farmers were employed by collectives to engage in 
agricultural production. The land market disappeared completely 
                                                             
5
 Agricultural socialist transformation means collectivization of land and 
agricultural production. 
6
 One exception is Ziliudi (“private plot”) in which land ownership was 
collectively owned and land use rights belong to farm households. During 
the period of planned economy in China, the proportion of Ziliudi increased 
from less than 5% to 15% as shown by Xiang and Su (2002). 
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during this stage. The second stage ended with the 
implementation of the HRS in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Under HRS, farm households were yielded land use rights while 
land ownership remained with the farmer collectives. Privatization 
of land use rights inevitably induced the emergence of the land 
rental market, even though the land transfer was illegal at the 
beginning of the HRS. And due to land ownership still being 
controlled by collectives and the Land Management Law which 
forbid land ownership transaction with individual units (firms, farm 
households, etc.), no land sale market could be established.  
 
In the end it was the change of land property right distribution that 
lead to the change of the land market form. In the first stage, land 
ownership and land use rights were privately owned. Therefore, a 
free land sale market and land rental market could be established. 
In the second stage, private land ownership and use rights were 
eliminated, land was collectively owned. This collective ownership 
was managed by the government in the era of planned economy. 
A land market, therefore, would not appear. In the last stage, the 
land rental market can be established based on privately owned 
land use rights
7
. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes land 
institutions and land rental market development before 1949. 
Section 3 focuses on land institutions and the land rental market 
                                                             
7
Land use rights can be transferred if the land use type is not changed. 
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in China after 1949; it also delves into the debate on land 
privatization and possible evolvement of land tenancy in the 
future. Section 4 tries to explore the relationship between the land 
rental market development and agricultural productivity and 
distribution. Section 5 summarizes and concludes this Chapter. 
2.2 Land institutions and land rental market development 
before 1949 
2.2.1 Development of the tenancy market 
Private land ownership emerged in the Spring and Autumn Period 
(722-476 BC) and was legalized in 361 BC to 338 BC with Shang 
Yang’s reforms during the Qin Dynasty (Chao, 2006, pp.32). 
Since then, private land ownership dominated most of China’s 
history, except for the period of 485 to 780 A.D (Chao, 1983; 
Chao, 2006, pp.32). The establishment of private land ownership 
led to the emergence of the land sale market and land rental 
market. One of the earliest records for land rental transaction was 
developed during 179-104 BC (Chao and Chen, 2006, pp. 243). 
In the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), private land ownership 
coexisted with state ownership and was the major form of land 
possession (Li, 1963). 
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Table 2.1 Share of tenant and rented land area in the Republic of China 
 Share of tenant (%)
a 
Rented land (%)
b
 
Province 1912 1917-1918 1931-1936 1936 
Northwest      
Chahaer 30 16 35 10.20 
Suiyuan 36 23 26 8.75 
Ningxia —— —— 27 —— 
Qinghai 18 —— 21 —— 
Gansu 16 18 22 —— 
Shaanxi 21 23 23 16.64 
North     
Shanxi 19 16 17 —— 
Hebei 13 13 12 12.89 
Shandong 13 14 12 12.63 
Henan 20 27 22 27.27 
East     
Jiangsu 31 31 33 42.33 
Anhui 43 33 44 52.64 
Zhejiang 41 36 47 51.31 
Central     
Hubei 38 36 40 27.89 
Hunan 48 70 48 47.80 
Jiangxi 41 30 41 45.10 
Southeast     
Fujian 41 34 42 39.33 
Guangdong 52 37 52 76.95 
Guangxi 35 —— 40 21.20 
Southwest     
Guizhou 33 —— 43 —— 
Yunnan 29 —— 38 —— 
Sichuan 51 —— 56 —— 
Average 28 —— 30 30.73 
Data source: a: Perkins (1984), pp. 115; b: Outline of National Land Survey, edited by 
Land Committee of Republic of China, 1936, pp: 36. 
 14 
 
The Qing government pursued laissez-faire policies in the 
agricultural sector (Myers and Wang, 2002; Perkins, 1984, pp. 
220). Engagement and enforcement of land rental contracts 
mainly followed customary laws (Myers, 1988; Myers and Wang, 
2002). But the government did interfere in the formulation of 
customary laws by establishing thebaojia system
8
 and 
disseminating Confucianism in communities (Myers and Wang, 
2002). Furthermore, in the early Qing Dynasty, the government 
reduced land taxes, supported farm households in exploring new 
land and improved the irrigation system, grain storage and 
distribution systems (Myers, 1988; Myers and Wang, 2002; 
Perkins, 1984, pp. 221-225). All these contributed to the 
agricultural outputs market and tenancy development. While there 
is no hard evidence that makes it possible to determine the exact 
percentage of tenant farms, Chao (2006, pp. 262) estimates that 
more than half the land during Qing was farmed by tenants
9
. 
 
Until the early 20th century, there were some reliable nation-wide 
land rental data. A summary of the land rental market in the first 
half of 20th century was presented in Table 2.1. The share of 
                                                             
8
Baojia is a collective neighborhood guarantee system in which 10 
households constitute a jia and 10 jias make up a bao (Encyclopædia 
Britannica Online, s.v. “baojia,” accessed December 06, 2013, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/441684/baojia.).  
9
 This estimation is based on the Fish scale book (Land registration book) 
from the Qing Dynasty. Most of the contents of the preserved Fish scale 
book refer to the Yangtze valley and south China. Therefore, this estimation 
cannot be considered representative for China as a whole. Moreover, there 
were debates about the reliability of the Fish scale book, see Ho (1988, pp. 
38-50), Chao (2010) for details. 
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tenants appears to be relatively constant, with a slight increase 
from 28% in 1912 to 30% in 1936. Geographically, however, the 
share of tenants and rented land show great heterogeneity. 
Regional differences in the land rental market participation may 
reflect a different degree in commercialization of agricultural 
products (Perkins, 1984, pp.123).  
2.2.2 Tenancy contract and permanent tenancy 
Fixed rent contracts, sharecropping, and wage contracts 
coexisted in the Qing Dynasty. Wu (1992, pp.102) examines land 
rental contract forms in 19 provinces from1736-1820. In total 
there were 1160 land rental contracts, only 7 (6%) of these were 
wage contracts, sharecropping accounted for 6.8% (79) of all 
contracts, while the remaining 1074 contracts were fixed rent 
contracts (708 of these contracts were paid with grain, the other 
348 paid with cash). While researchers must be aware that these 
figures are not necessarily representative, they do, however, 
strongly indicate a dominance of fixed rent contracts during the 
Qing Dynasty. 
 
Patterns in the land rental market of the Republic of China did not 
show many differences compared to the late Qing Dynasty. A 
nation-wide survey by the Land Commission in 1935-1936 
demonstrates that fixed rent contracts, either grain rent or cash 
rent, were the dominant land rental contract form (see Appendix 
Table 2). On average, up to 84.63% of all land rental contracts 
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were fixed rent contracts (24.62% paid by cash and 60.01% paid 
by grain), sharecropping accounted for 15.23% of total land rental 
contracts, the remaining 0.14% pertain to other forms of land 
rental contracts, for example wage contracts. 
 
Land rental contracts form and contract duration varies across 
regions
10
. In northern China, where land quality was 
comparatively low and production risks were high, short term 
share contracts were the most popular kind of contracts (Perkins, 
1984, pp. 131-138). In the Yangtze valley and southern China, 
however, long term fixed rent contracts were prevalent.  
 
Return on agricultural investments heavily affected the length of 
land rental contracts (Perkins, 1984, pp. 133). In the Yangtze 
valley and southern China, where agricultural infrastructure like 
irrigation and the transportation system were well established and 
markets were prosperous, long-term rental contracts were made 
in order to make tenants preserve land fertility and promote long-
term investments. In northern China, however, the agricultural 
                                                             
10
Chao (1983) describes the coexistence of different contract forms from a 
general equilibrium point of view; tenant and landlord will chose a land rental 
contract which provides the maximum profit for both. Chao has also shown 
that share tenancy is not an equilibrium result but a partnership between 
tenant and landlord that perpetuates the share tenancy. Eswaran and Kotwal 
(1985) assume that landlords are more efficient in providing farm 
management skills and tenants are specialized in supply labor supervision. 
Both management skills and labor supervision are key to agricultural 
production and non-tradable. Landlords chose the land rental contract from 
which they can maximize their profit. Singh (1991) provides an extensive 
review of contract choices in the land rental market.  
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infrastructure and market were less well established, returns on 
investments in agriculture heavily correlated to production risks. 
Both landlords and tenants lacked incentives to enter long-term 
land rental contracts.  
 
From the above analysis, the incentives pertaining to 
sharecropping and fixed rent contracts are obvious. In northern 
China, shared risks in agricultural production induced landlords 
and tenants to conclude share contracts. In Yangtze and southern 
China, long-term fixed rent contracts have been proven beneficial 
for both landlords and tenants as they provide incentives for 
tenants to improve land quality and increase agricultural 
production. Besides incentives and market factors, there were 
two more land institutions related to prevailing long-term fixed 
rent contracts in the Yangtze valley and southern China, which 
were permanent tenancy and landlord bursaries (zu zhan).  
 
In the late imperial Qing, permanent tenancy thrived as a result of 
free market and population pressure. The question when 
permanent tenancy exactly began remains controversial. We 
know, however, that it was widespread during the Qing Dynasty 
(from 1616-1912), especially in the Yangtze valley and southern 
China (Chao, 2005)
11
. 
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 Chao (2005, pp. 15-16) summarized debates about origins of permanent 
tenancy. Northern Song Dynasty (960-1127) and Southern Song Dynasty 
(1127-1279) was considered as the start of permanent tenancy respectively 
by Fu (1961, pp. 47) and Wu (1992, pp.87). 
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Permanent tenancy is a land use right which is permanently held 
by tenants. Myers and Wang (2002) called it “two lords to a field”. 
One lord holds land ownership (landlord), another lord holds the 
land use right (tenant). Land owners cannot evict tenants 
because the land use right under permanent tenancy is 
autonomous from land ownership and land owners do not have 
the right to take land use rights away from tenants. 
 
There are three origins of permanent tenancy (Chao, 2005, 
pp.16-29; Wu, 1992, pp. 88-89): 1. Land owners use permanent 
tenancy as a reward to tenants who helped them to reclaim 
uncultivated land, which means permanent tenancy is a property 
incentive to work hard (Myers, 1988). 2. Permanent tenancy 
emerges gradually due to mortgaged land use rights. 3. 
Permanent tenancy occurs as a result of increasing deposits paid 
by tenants to land owners. When the land owner is reluctant or 
unable to pay the deposit back, permanent land use rights may 
be granted to the tenant as compensation so that the tenant 
continues to pay land rent. 
 
There is no official record to demonstrate the proportion of 
permanent tenancy in the Qing dynasty at national level, but there 
are some statistics pertaining to the local level. Based on the Fish 
scale Book (Land Register Books), Zhang (1988) estimated that 
arable land under permanent tenancy accounted for 95.5% of 
total arable land in Changzhou County (Yangtze delta) in 1676. 
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Another estimate of permanent tenancy based on the Fish scale 
Book was conducted by Chao (2003). Zhao estimated that arable 
land under permanent tenancy accounted for 48% of total arable 
land and 30% of farm households had permanent tenancy rights 
in Xiuning County, Anhui Province, around 1573-1620. Although it 
may not be a direct cause for permanent tenancy, fixed rent 
contracts serve as a precondition for permanent tenancy (Chao, 
2006). Therefore, prevalence of fixed rent contracts may also 
indicate permanent tenancy is widespread.  
 
In the Republic of China (1912-1949), a nation-wide survey 
showed that permanent tenancy made up 21.08% of all contracts. 
Up to 70.74% of contracts did not specify the duration of the 
rental (more details can be found in Appendix Table 3). 
 
The emergence of permanent tenancy might be a sign of 
enhanced tenure security for tenants. But there was no solid data 
to demonstrate changes of permanent tenancy in the late Qing. 
Feuerwerker’s empirical research (1983) indicates that the 
percentage of one-year land rental contracts increased slightly 
between 1924 and 1934, that the share of 3-10 years land rental 
contracts remained constant, while the percentage of 10-20 years 
land rental contracts and permanent tenancy decreased. This 
shift from long term to short term rental contracts might imply an 
increase of tenure insecurity for tenants.  
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Permanent tenancy, in general, was governed by customary laws 
(Chao, 2005, pp. 66-67). The late Qing government tried to 
legalize permanent tenancy in its civil code which was 
accomplished in 1911 to settle conflicts caused by permanent 
tenancy. Unfortunately, the Qing Dynasty’s civil code never had a 
chance to be implemented because of the Xinhai Revolution in 
1911 and the establishment of the Republic of China (1912-1949) 
in 1912. Finally, in 1930 the Land Law of the Republic of China 
was issued and regulated that permanent tenancy must be 
registered.  
 
Landlord bursary emerged as a result of increasing numbers of 
tenants refusing to pay rent following the Taiping Rebellion (Wu, 
1992, pp. 148-149) and the increasing phenomenon of landlord 
absenteeism in the late Qing Dynasty in the Yangtze valley and 
southern China (Feuerwerker, 1980; Chao, 2000). According to 
Feuerwerker (1980), landlord bursary is the place where 
“individual landowners, primarily urban businessmen, entrusted 
their lands and tenants to the management of the bursary owner 
and received a proportionate share of the profits after taxes and 
other expenses were met”. Widespread fixed rent contracts in 
these regions should contribute to landlords moving out as fixed 
rent contracts free landlords from farm management. Easy 
access to the agricultural products market and the desire to 
setting up lineages in the countryside encourage urban 
businessmen to buy land in rural areas and become absentee 
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landlords (Myers and Wang, 2002). According to Perkins’ (1984, 
pp. 117) estimate, in the 1930s, approximately 75 per cent of 
rented out land was owned by absentee landlords.  
2.3 Land institutions and land rental market development 
after 1949 
During the planned economy period from 1949 to 1978, 
agricultural land in China is collectively owned and used. 
Allocation of land was regulated by governmental administration, 
no land market existed. In the land reform of 1950, complete land 
property rights were given to farmers, but collectivization in 1953 
eliminated private land property rights. Information about the land 
rental market in this period (1950-1953) is scarce, so we treat it 
as part of collectivization in 1949-1978.  
 
The reversion from collective farming to household farming after 
1978 in China experienced three phases (Lipton, 2009). These 
three phases are common for most transition economies. The first 
phase is de-collectivization, which in the case of China, was 
achieved with the implementation of the HRS from 1979 to 1984. 
Due to the socialist ideology at that time, it was never easy to 
implement a market-orientated reform (Du, 2006; Lin, 1987). The 
HRS was initially evolved from grassroots and then got 
permission from the central authorities since its successfulness in 
promoting agricultural production (Du, 2006; Lin, 1987). The 
success of the HRS was not unique. Egalitarian de-
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collectivization in Vietnam in 1988-90 and Azerbaijan in 1996 was 
also accompanied by improvements in efficiency and equity terms 
(Lipton, 2009).  
 
The second phase is market liberalization which includes 
liberalizing agricultural output and input markets. Reforms in this 
phase are long and lasting, and still ongoing in China. 
Implementing the HRS ended the state monopoly for purchasing 
and marketing farm goods. Grain quota under HRS still distorted 
the grain market until 2006 when they are finally abolished. Since 
then, however, subsidies have been increasing in agriculture 
which includes subsidies on seed, land, machinery purchase, and 
other inputs (Huang et al, 2011). Surprisingly these subsidies 
barely affect farm household production decisions, which may 
due to subsidies received by farm household are rather small (in 
2008 farm households received on average 442 Yuan or 43.24 
Euro from the government (at price of 2008)) (Huang et al, 2011).  
 
Another important liberalization affected the labor market. Before 
the HRS was implemented, labor migration from rural to urban 
areas was almost impossible (Cai et al, 2008). Reforms first 
allowed farmers to do business out of farm (work in town and 
village enterprise (TVE)), then labor was allowed to move inter-
regionally. However, the household registration system (hukou), 
which divides the population of the People’s Republic of China 
into rural and urban population, still imposes restrictions on 
 23 
 
internal labor migration in two ways (Chan and Zhang, 1999). 
Firstly, labor with rural status cannot benefit from the social 
security program and their children cannot be enrolled in 
elementary and secondary schools in the city they moved in. 
Secondly, most migrated workers find employment in the private 
sector as their rural status prevents them from working for urban 
state enterprises. Further reform in the labor market should focus 
on deconstructing discriminating elements of the hukou system. 
 
Finally the reversion from collective farming to household farming 
should be accomplished by securing and expanding land property 
rights of farm households. The Land Administration Law was 
enacted in 1986. Distribution of land rights - collective ownership 
and individual use right - was legalized with this law. But land 
rental activity was explicitly prohibited. And the duration of land 
contracts between collective and farmers was not specified. 
 
Restrictions on land rental activities were relaxed in 1988. It 
started with an amendment of the constitution of the People’s 
Republic in April 1988 to allow the transfer of land use rights 
according to relevant laws. In December 1988, the article which 
prevents land rental was removed from the Land Administration 
Law. It was not until 1998, that the revised Land Administration 
Law stipulated that the duration of land contracts between 
collectives and farm households was 30 years. From that year, 
village collectives started to reallocate land among farm 
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households and made new 30 year-land contracts with farmers.  
 
A milestone in securing land use rights of farm households was 
the enactment of the Rural Land Contract Law in 2003. This law 
specifically regulates land contracts of farm households with 
collectives pertaining to the land rental market, resolution of 
disputes and liabilities. It provides that the duration of land rental 
contracts should not go beyond the deadline of land contracts 
between farmers and village collectives, so that the duration of 
land rental contracts cannot exceed 30 years.  
 
The 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 
2008 proposed that land contract between village collective and 
farm households should be permanent, which means that the 30 
years land contract can be extended to permanent. This in turn 
provided the opportunity to conclude longer land rental contracts.  
 
The above-mentioned laws and regulations have shown great 
improvements in securing land use rights of farm households. 
Even though administrative reallocation of land has not 
completely disappeared, the frequency of it has been vastly 
reduced since 1998 (Tao et al., 2009). Right now most of the 
administrative land reallocation aims at adjusting land held by 
farm households to demographic changes. And this reallocation is 
not just an enforced redistribution. Instead it depends on the 
availability of redistributable idle collective land. Into the 21st 
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century, administrative reallocation is no longer a major threat to 
land security of farm households compare to government 
expropriation (Vendryes, 2010). 
 
Amendments of Land Administration Law in the past years try to 
restrict the government’s arbitrary appropriation of land but failed. 
One reason is that any construction land has to be state owned. 
Therefore if agricultural land is intended to be transferred for non-
agricultural use, it has to be changed from collective ownership to 
state ownership. It means that governmental appropriation is a 
necessary step for land development. The Land Administration 
Law provides that land appropriation must serve “the public 
interest”. But the scope of “public interest” remains vague, which 
gives local governments the opportunity to expropriate land in the 
name of the “public interest” (Ping-Li, 2003). The only change of 
the Land Administration Law with regards to taking of land was 
slight rise of compensation for expropriation. Since 1986, 
compensation to land expropriation couldn’t exceed the average 
yield of three previous years by more than 20 times. In 2004, this 
law was amended, allowing for compensations up to 30 times of 
the average yield, though the compensation level is varying 
across regions.   
 
All these three steps of reversion have implications for land rental 
market development. The HRS creates individual land use right. 
Legal reforms make these rights tradable, while market 
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liberalization allows for profitable transaction of land use right. All 
these aspects contribute to the land rental market development in 
China. The proportion of rented land has increased from less than 
3% in 1995 (Turner, et al, 1998) to 16.2% in 2011 (see Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 Land rental market development in China, 1995-2011 
 
Land rental area 
(thousand hectare) 
Percentage of Total 
Contracted land area (%) 
1995 - 3
* 
2007 4250 5.20 
2008 7270 8.90 
2009 10130 12.00 
2010 12470 14.70 
2011 13800 16.20 
Data source: * Turner, et. Al, 1998; land rental data from 2007-
2011 were published by Ministry of Agricultural of China.  
 
More than 30 years after the implementation of the HRS, there 
seems to be no sign of land ownership privatization in China, and 
land privatization remains a controversial issue. There are mainly 
two arguments for people who oppose land privatization. The first 
is that land privatization would lead to an increase in landless 
peasants and impoverished farm households, which is an 
impediment to economic development (Li, 2004; Wen, 2009). We 
could not find evidence for this counterfactual argument to show if 
land privatization would generate these negative results, but we 
can look into experiences from other countries. Vietnam 
decollectivized its collective farming system and equally 
distributed land among farm households between 1988-1990, 
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which is later than China’s decollectivization, but goes further by 
granting farm households private land ownership (Ravallion and 
van de Walle, 2008). In 1998, Vietnam deregulated restrictions on 
the land rental and sales market. Indeed, such market-oriented 
reforms lea to an increase in landlessness, but not necessarily 
result in increasing poverty. It much rather depends on why 
landlessness increased, i.e. farm households give up land due to 
negative shocks or shifts in occupation from agricultural to non-
agricultural sectors. Ravallion and van de Walle (2008) find an 
astute explanation for worries about land privatization and 
marketization. Especially for poor farmers, gain or loss from 
selling land and working off-farm depends on how the labor 
market equilibrium changes due to an increase of labor supply. 
However, as long as poor farmers can earn more from off-farm 
work than from cultivating their land, losing land due to land 
reforms may not raise the poverty rate. As in Vietnam, Ravallion 
and van de Walle (2008) found that landlessness closely 
correlated with non-family work opportunity, and there was no 
evidence indicating that an increase in landlessness causes 
poverty.  
 
On the other hand, it does not mean that poor people would not 
be negatively affected by land privatization. Gain or loss from 
selling land depends on whether the land value is set correctly. 
Land valuation not only depends on the development of the land 
rental and sales market but also on the development of the off-
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farm labor market, other input and output markets and the rural 
credit market. In developing countries it is possible that 
incompleteness in these relevant markets is pervasive, as it 
would undervalue land and put the poor at risk of losing from 
selling their land. The second disagreement derived from the role 
of land as providing informal social security in rural China. 
Because rural areas in China are not covered by formal social 
security (pensions, unemployment insurances, etc.), the 
egalitarian distribution of land use rights and common land 
ownership ensures that every farm household in rural areas has 
land to live on and prevents them from losing it by selling it (Li, 
2004; Wen, 2009). Not only is land is an income source for farm 
households, it also provides opportunity to use family labor and 
generate labor income. This implies that land privatization should 
not be implemented without prior reforms of the social security 
system in order to include people in rural areas. Furthermore, a 
prosperous off-farm labor market capable of absorbing farm labor 
would be essential.  
 
Proponents of land privatization argued that, on the one hand, 
land privatization can promote incentives for farm households to 
invest long-term and hence can stimulate long-term agricultural 
growth, because land can be used as collateral in order to get 
loans for investments (Beslay, 1995; Yang, 2001).However, the 
role of land as collateral to improve investment in agriculture 
remains dubious and depends on the development of the rural 
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credit market (Lipton, 2009). Empirical studies on Vietnam, 
Ethiopia and China have shown that it is indeed land tenure 
security which has a positive effect on long-term investments 
(Ngo, 2005, Deininger & Jin, 2006; Jacoby et al, 2002). This 
implies that the effect of full land ownership on investment could 
be rather weak (Lipton, 2009). As shown by Abdulai et al (2011) 
by using plot level data from Ghana that long-term investment on 
land with full property rights is significantly higher than on rented 
land. But this difference might be due to the impact of tenure 
duration, as full property rights on land means infinite duration 
which is significantly longer than fixed or shared rental contracts; 
and longer tenure duration tends to improve long-term investment 
on land (Abdulai et al, 2011). Clearly, Abdulai et al (2011) noticed 
the possible effects of tenure duration on investment, but in the 
results they tabulated, this effect is missing.  
 
On the other hand, land privatization is expected to be an 
effective tool against government appropriation (Zhou, 2004). 
Land property arrangements in rural China could not provide an 
effective way for farmers against government acquisition due to 
the fact that under collective land ownership, as village cadres 
rather than farmers represent land owners. While village cadres 
are employed by the local government, they do not represent 
farmers’ interests in the process of land expropriation. Change 
from collective ownership to individual ownership makes farmers 
represent their own interests on land and can thus be more 
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effective against government appropriation. However, the 
government usually appropriates land in the name of the “public 
interest”, and the scope of “public interest” is not clarified by law 
(Ping-Li, 2003). Therefore, the government might still have the 
power to invade individual land ownership. But individual land 
ownership would cause higher transaction cost in land 
appropriation than collective land ownership and at least 
complicate government appropriation.  
 
Government appropriation under the HRS brings about another 
problem. Laws and regulations in China granted the government 
exclusive rights to transfer the use of land from agriculture to non-
agricultural purposes (factory construction, real estate, 
infrastructures, etc.). This exclusive right generates numerous 
revenues for the local government, as the government 
appropriates land from farm households and compensates them 
only according to the average annual yield of land, and then rents 
out land based on how the land would be developed (Ping-Li, 
2003). This arrangement of land property rights is a driving force 
for the rural urban income gap in China (James, 2007). 
 
The debates above demonstrate that if land privatization is going 
to be implemented, it should be implemented with great caution. 
Especially reforms in other relevant markets should come about 
simultaneously.  
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While the usefulness of land privatization is questioned, there are 
further political impediments to be considered. de Janvry and 
Sadoulet (2011) argued that the government is reluctant to grant 
complete land property to farmers in order to secure their future 
control. Another possible reason why the central government 
keeps land collectively owned is that it reduces the governments’ 
land expropriation costs for building infrastructure and increases 
public revenue by giving the government exclusive rights to 
change land use as was discussed previously
12
. 
 
In spite of these, the land rental market developed in recent years 
due to an abundance of off-farm work opportunities (Yao,1999) 
and a relatively secure land use rights position (Jacoby et al., 
2002; Yao, 2004). In the US, a typical private property-based 
economy, the land rental market is the primary way of allocating 
land. Its annual ownership transfers are about 5% of total 
farmland and relatively lower compared to38% in the land rental 
market (Foster, 2006). This may imply that, whether land is 
privately owned or collectively, the land rental market always 
plays the major role in the allocation of land as long as land use 
rights are privately owned and secured. Moreover, this may imply 
                                                             
12
Under the provision of the Land Management Law, any land use change 
from agriculture to nonagricultural use should change land ownership from 
collectively-owned to state-owned. And any individual unit that wants to use 
land for nonagricultural purposes should rent land from the government. 
Government-acquired arable land from collectives only compensates 
according to agricultural use, while it rents out land according to 
nonagricultural use. In 2007, this “land finance” accounted for 41.55% of 
local government revenue (Zhang and Li, 2010). 
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that the agricultural production itself may not yield sufficient 
demand for private ownership, while such a demand may come 
from outside of the agriculture sector (illegal appropriation of 
cultivated land and unjust compensation to farmers).  
 
From a certain point of view, land tenancy in China at the current 
stage is similar to permanent tenancy which existed pre-1949. 
Land is owned by collective and farm households possess land-
use rights. This ownership structure is analogue to permanent 
tenancy in which land ownership belongs to landlords and land-
use rights were kept by tenants. Even though farm households do 
not have the right to sell land use rights as in permanent tenancy, 
they do have the right to rent out land use rights which constitute 
the foundation of the land rental market in today’s China. In the 
circumstance where developing a private land ownership regime 
is unlikely, it could be preferable for current land institutions to 
evolve to state permanent tenancy as suggested by some 
scholars (e.g. An, 1988; Dong, 2010). 
 
But there are barriers to overcome to make this evolvement 
possible. First, land is used as insurance for farmers who are 
weakly covered by the formal insurance market and the social 
security system. Keeping land use right exclusively in the hand of 
village members can make sure that rural people can remain self-
sustainable. Thus, the social security system should be well-
established in rural areas before land use rights can be sold. 
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Secondly, the implementation of permanent tenancy would lead 
to a substantial increase of the land use right price, even higher 
than land ownership (one reason could be that the demand for 
land use rights is high). This is what happened in the middle of 
the Qing dynasty when the land use right price was two times 
higher than land ownership (Chao, 2005, pp. 45-48). That implies 
buying land use rights could involve sufficiently large money 
transactions which make small and poor farm households unable 
to access. More importantly, farm households in China usually 
were rationed out from the formal credit market because they do 
not allow to using their house and land as collateral for loan. 
Therefore, it is necessary to improve accessibility to the credit 
market for farm households to make them benefit from selling 
land use rights on the market.  
2.4 Land rental market development, productivity and 
distribution 
It is difficult to analyze the historical relationship between the land 
rental market and agricultural production. Lack of data is the 
major obstacle. Perkins (1984) estimated grain yields from 1400 
to 1957 in China and found an increasing trend in output per unit 
of land (yield data only available in the year of 1400, 1776, 1851, 
and 1957). But as we mentioned above, only after 1911 there 
were reliable data on shares of land tenancy. We may have 
observed a slight increase in shares of tenancy from 1912 to the 
period of 1931-1936 nation-wide in table 2.1, from 28% to 30%. 
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However, the increase in yields may not necessarily caused by 
increase in share of tenants.  
 
One way out of this dilemma is to look into the correlation 
between the share of tenancy and land rent at provincial level 
(Feuerwerker, 1983). Feuerwerker (1983) has shown that there is 
a positive correlation between these two variables in the late Qing 
period (1800-1911). Land rent, either fixed or shared, positively 
correlates with productivity of land. Therefore, evidence from 
Feuerwerker (1983) may show a positive correlation between 
participation in the land rental market and land productivity. 
 
Another hint for the relationship between land rental market 
development and agricultural production might be found in the 
change of duration of land rental contracts. Change to permanent 
tenancy may provide additional incentives to tenants to let them 
invest in land and promote long-term agricultural production 
(Myers and Wang, 2002). But permanent tenancy may also 
provide incentives to land owners to not invest in land and 
undermine long-term growth of agriculture. Thus, based on 
historical data there is not much to say about how permanent 
tenancy affects agricultural productivity.  
 
Next, we will turn to the exploration of the relationship between 
the land rental market development and land distribution. Before 
we conduct the investigation, it is helpful to examine how land 
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and population in China changed historically in table 2.3. It shows 
that arable land has grown steadily, while the population has 
grown faster than arable land since 1776; consequently arable 
land per capita decreased on a long-term basis. Increasing 
population pressure on land can divide land economically and 
politically.  
 
Table 2.3 Arable land and population in history of China 
Year Arable land 
area 
(Million mu) 
Year 
 
Population 
(Million) 
Arable land 
per capita 
(mu) 
1072 660 1109 121 5.45 
1393 522 1391 60 8.70 
1581 793 1592 200 3.96 
1662 713 1662 83 8.59 
1784 989 1776 268 3.69 
1812 1025 1800 295 3.47 
1887 1202 1848 426 2.82 
1936 - 1936 - 2.70
* 
1952 1618.78 1952 574.82  1.88 
1996 1950.5 1996 1223.83  1.59 
2008 1825.7 2008 1328.02 0.92 
Data source: Data from 1072-1887 comes from Chao and Chen 
(2006), pp.116. Data from 1952-2008 comes from China 
Statistical Yearbooks, compiled by National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. Beijing:  China Statistical Press.  
 
Another factor affecting land distribution in China is the 
inheritance system in which family wealth is equally distributed 
among sons of the family (Chao and Chen, 2006, pp. 146). 
Whether the inheritance system would divide land or not depends 
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on the population growth rate in relation to land growth, and on 
fertility behavior of land-rich families and land-poor families. We 
have already shown that land per capita was decreasing after 
1776. Lamson (1935) studied reproduction behavior of rich and 
poor families in China before 1933. Lamson found that in rich 
families more babies survived than in poor families (4.57 children 
for rich families and 2.29 for poor). And the sex ratio for children 
in the age of 5 to 14 was 123.2 boys on 100 girls in the 1930s 
(Chao, 2006, pp. 129). Even though rich families are more likely 
to own more land, they also tend to have more successors to 
divide land. This empirical evidence may suggest that the 
inheritance system in China of the 1930s was a force to divide 
land.  
 
The above analysis shows that both population pressure and the 
inheritance system contributed to the diffusion of land. Evidence 
shows that the percentage of landless peasants was decreasing 
from 1746 to 1930s, and land possession of large land owners 
was decreasing in the same period (Chao, 2006, pp. 153-160). 
But we should note that most of the data used by Chao (2006) 
are not representative for the national level, given that the 
decreasing concentration of land could just be a regional 
phenomenon.  
 
To investigate the relationship between the land rental market and 
land distribution, we use data from the Land Committee of the 
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Republic of China (LCRC). Based on the Outline of the National 
Land Survey compiled by the LCRC we have developed a graph 
in Figure 2.1 to show changes in farm size before and after land 
rental activities. We can see from this figure that after the land 
rental transaction, the proportion of farms under 10 mu decreased 
(farms under 5 mu reduced from 34.61% to 24.38% and farms 
between 5-9.9 mu reduced slightly from 23.99% to 22.60%), and 
the percentage of large farms (farm size above 10 mu) increased 
correspondingly (especially for farms whose size bigger than100 
mu increased from 1.52% to 7.43%). These changes may imply a 
concentration of operational land through the land rental market. 
Figure 2.1 Farm size change due to land rental market participation 
 
 
 
It seems that in the 1930s land was not transferred from large 
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land owners to small or landless peasants. On the contrary, it was 
small land owners who rented out land to large farm operators. 
This phenomenon may lead us to rethinking two observations 
from our own experience. The first holds, as mentioned before, 
that land rented out by absentee landlord accounts for 75% of the 
total rented land (Perkins, 1984, pp. 117). If Perkins was right, 
then most of absentee landlords should be small land owners. 
But this may contradict Perkins’ description of absentee landlords 
as wealthy and of high status (Perkins, 1984, pp. 118-122). Even 
if absentee landlords indeed own small land, we do not know that 
for sure.  
 
A second observation is derived from the argument that the land 
rental market provides a way for the poor to access land 
(Sadoulet et al., 2001). This argument has been verified by many 
scholars pertaining to China and Vietnam (Deininger and Jin, 
2005; Deininger and Jin, 2008). But if poor peasants are rationed 
out from the rural credit market, then the land rental market may 
not be friendly to the poor (Boucher et al., 2005). Shan (1995) 
found that in the Yangtze Valley during the Republic of China, 
loans of poor peasants was mainly used for smoothing 
consumption and paying back debts, the loans of richer peasants 
were mainly for production. This may explain the observation in 
Figure 2.1. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
The land rental market during the late Qing Dynasty and the 
Republic of China experienced only few governmental 
interventions. Different regions developed different land rental 
patterns based on region-specific agricultural production risks, 
land fertility, agricultural infrastructures, market conditions, and 
customary laws. What are the implications of this freely 
developed land rental market on agricultural productivity? 
 
In traditional agricultural societies, researchers often found 
inverse relationships between farm size and agricultural 
productivity (Fan and Chan-Kang, 2005; Lipton, 2009, Chapter 2). 
It is probably true in countries where agricultural labor is 
abundant and labor-intensive production technologies are widely 
used. The moral hazard problem in a principle-agent relationship 
may prevent large landlords from efficiently using hired labor in 
agricultural production. The land rental market in this situation 
can reduce farm size and save productivity from the inverse 
relationship. Feuerwerker (1980) shows that large land owners 
cultivate some of their land by using hired labor and rent out the 
rest. Furthermore, in the early 20
th
 century, the farm size was 
closely correlated to family size.  
 
From historical records, it is hard to tell how the land rental 
market development affects agricultural production in the long-
term. In a traditional agrarian society, increase in yields mainly 
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depends on increase in inputs, for example labor. If Perkins’ 
estimate of yield growth from 1400 to 1957 was correct, it may be 
due to increase in labor supply in the same period, as we found 
that the population density was also increasing. The role of the 
land rental market in this process could be reallocating land 
among labor; thus relay on the “inverse relationship” yield can 
increase in the long-term.  
 
Finally we found that a well-established land rental market may 
disadvantage the poor if rural credit market rations poor peasants 
out and if poor peasants borrow mainly for consumption and not 
for production.  
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Chapter 3 Analytical framework 
3.1 Farm household model 
Farm households in developing countries are living in an 
environment of prevailing market imperfections and restrictions. 
Thus, farm households have developed strategies to cope with 
market failures and to maximize the benefits from allocation of 
family resources (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006). The farm 
household model is the basic tool of analysis in this context (for 
instance, Carter and Yao, 2002; Sicular, 1986).  
 
Using the farm household model in the event of market failures 
implies that farm household consumption and production 
decisions are non-separable (Singh, Squire, and Strauss, 1986). 
The problem of farm households is to maximize the utility from 
consumption and leisure by generating income from allocation of 
family endowments (labor and land generally): 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑋,𝐿1,𝐿2,𝑅𝐼,𝑅𝑂,𝑀  𝑈(𝑋, 𝑇 − 𝐿1 − 𝐿2)                                            (3.1) 
𝑠. 𝑡.:   
𝑃𝑋𝑋 = w𝐿2 + 𝑃𝑦𝐹(𝐿1, ?̅? + 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑅𝑂 , 𝑀; 𝑉) + 𝑟(𝑅𝑂 − 𝑅𝐼) − 𝑃𝑀𝑀 + 𝐼   (3.2) 
𝐿1 + 𝐿2 ≤ 𝑇                                                                                (3.3) 
𝑅𝑂 ≤ ?̅?                                                                                       (3.4) 
𝑋, 𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝑅𝐼 , 𝑅𝑂, 𝑀 ≥ 0                                                                 (3.5) 
where  U   is the utility function, X  is the consumption goods 
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vector and XP  is the corresponding price vector. In this model we 
assume that there is no agricultural labor market. Therefore, the 
labor used in agricultural production 1L , plus off-farm labor supply
2L  cannot exceed the total time endowment of farm households
T .Farm households have access to the land rental market where 
they can either rent land( IR ), or rent out land( OR ) at market 
price( r ). M  denotes intermediate inputs in agricultural 
production purchased at price MP . V is capital used in the 
production which is fixed in the short term. w  is the off-farm work 
wage rate.  F   is a constant return to scale production function.  
 
Farm households allocate their land and labor in the agricultural 
production and off-farm work through the land rental market and 
the off-farm labor market to generate income that supports 
household consumption. In the context of this study it is of 
particular relevance to find out how these allocations affect the 
agricultural production efficiency and income distribution among 
farm households. 
 
For we are not particularly interested in the consumption effect of 
the land rental market or the reverse, we can therefore ignore the 
utility function and concentrate on the objective of farm 
households to maximize income from agricultural and non-
agricultural activities. There is another empirical argument which 
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contributes to this rationale: for estimating consumer good 
demand functions and output supply and input demand functions. 
It is common to assume the two sets of error terms in these two 
system equations are uncorrelated in order to get consistent 
estimations for function coefficients (Strauss, 1986b). With these 
considerations in mind, problem (3.1)-(3.5) collapses to profit 
maximization (see also Carter and Yao, 2002): 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑋,𝐿1,𝐿2,𝑅𝐼,𝑅𝑂,𝑀𝜋 = 𝑤𝐿2 + 𝑃𝑦𝐹(𝐿1, ?̅? + 𝑅𝐼 − 𝑅𝑂, 𝑀; 𝑉) + 𝑟(𝑅𝑂 − 𝑅𝐼) −
𝑃𝑀𝑀 + 𝐼                                                                                          (3.6) 
s. t.: 𝐿1 + 𝐿2 ≤ 𝑇                                                                              (3.7) 
𝑅𝑂 ≤ ?̅?                                                                                            (3.8) 
𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝑅𝐼 , 𝑅𝑂, 𝑀 ≥ 0                                                                    (3.9) 
 
Problem (3.6)-(3.9) is the model to start with. It governs farm 
household participation in the land rental market. This decision 
has an effect on agricultural production efficiency and on the 
income generating scheme of farm households and hence on 
income distribution among farm households. Before we go to the 
participation analysis of farm households in the land rental market, 
we will first concentrate on how participation affects agricultural 
production efficiency and income distribution.  
3.2 Land rental market and agricultural production efficiency 
In this section, we pay attention to the impact of the land rental 
market on agricultural technical efficiency in rural Chongqing. Two 
contradicting hypotheses were developed. The first (we denote 
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this hypothesis as H1) stipulates that two ways to make farm 
households more efficient: 1) the land rental market can improve 
agricultural technical efficiency by transferring land from less 
technically efficient farm households to more technically efficient 
farm households, 2) farm households can raise their technical 
efficiency level by participating in land rental market. This 
hypothesis just follows the doctrine of new classical economics 
that transaction in a competitive market is a Pareto improvement. 
 
But the land rental market in China cannot be regarded as 
competitive. Moreover, farm households may have different 
abilities to access off-farm work opportunities and receive 
different wages. This leads to the alternative hypothesis that more 
efficient farm households leave agriculture for well-paid off-farm 
work and rent land to less efficient farm households through the 
land rental market (we denote this hypothesis as H2).  
 
First, we focus on validating H1. In terms of the efficiency effect of 
the land rental market, there seems to be a broad consensus that 
access to the land rental market can improve agricultural 
production efficiency (Deininger and Jin, 2005; Jin and Deininger, 
2009; Feng, 2008; Zhang et al., 2011). Feng (2008) and Zhang et 
al (2011) both employed stochastic frontier analysis to study the 
impact of land rental on technical efficiency but fail to incorporate 
regularity conditions in their estimation.  
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In their collaborations, Deininger and Jin tackle this relationship 
from a different angle. They use “agricultural ability” as an 
indicator of agricultural production efficiency, which is analogue to 
the “residual” in the growth model (Solow, 1957). Then they show 
that, both analytically and empirically, that there is a transfer of 
land from farm households with lower agricultural ability to those 
with higher agricultural ability via the land rental market. And they 
also show that the land rental market is more efficient in 
generating this efficiency improving transfer than administrative 
reallocation.  
 
Under the H1, the effect of access to the land rental market on 
agricultural production efficiency is twofold. On the one hand, 
land can be transferred from less efficient farm households to 
more efficient farm households. Deininger and Jin(2005) focus on 
this “horizontal effect” which is represented by the horizontal 
arrow in figure 3.1. 𝐹𝐹′ is the production frontier which is denoted 
by 1. The height of histograms represents the production 
efficiency level of farm households 𝐴 and 𝐵. The horizontal arrow 
shows that land is transferred from the less efficient farm 
household 𝐴 to the more efficient farm household 𝐵.  
 
On the other hand, farm households can improve their own 
production efficiency by participating in the land rental market, 
which is the focus of Feng (2008) and Zhang et al (2011). This 
“vertical effect” is shown in Figure 3.1 by the vertical arrows which 
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indicate improvement of production efficiency.  
Figure 3.1 Production efficiency change and land rental market 
 
 
While the horizontal effect implies improvement in land use 
efficiency, the vertical effect means improvement in farm 
management skills. Both of these effects are important but none 
of the above studies covers these two effects together. In this 
study we use stochastic frontier analysis to investigate the 
horizontal effect and the vertical effect in synthesis. 
 
Building upon the results of production function analysis, we can 
develop a method to measure land rental market imperfection 
and off-farm labor market imperfection by using differences 
between the marginal product of land and agricultural labor and 
their corresponding market prices. With these measures we can 
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assess the effect of market imperfection on farm households’ 
participation in the land rental market and on income distribution.  
 
The elaboration above provides a strategy for testing test H1. 
Testing H2 is relatively simple. We classify farm households 
equally into three groups according to their technical efficiency 
level: less efficient farm households (LFHs), medium efficient 
farm households (EFHs), and more efficient farm households 
(MFHs). Then we examine whether any of the more efficient farm 
households rent out land and how many of them. Moreover, it will 
be analyzed how many less efficient farm households rent land. 
3.3 Land rental market and income distribution 
Studies in this realm mainly focus on the equalization effect of 
access to the land rental market, according to which the land 
rental market is a favorable tool for the “land poor” to find access 
to land (Sadoulet, et al., 2001). It suggests that the land rental 
market equalizes land distribution in terms of operational farm 
size. The rationale behind this assumption is derived from 
observing the competitive land rental market and decreasing 
marginal return to land.  
 
In an agrarian society where land is scarce relative to labor, the 
distribution of land determines the distribution of wealth. But as 
farm households diversified their income sources, the role of land 
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in the distribution of wealth becomes less important
13
. This is 
what Brandt and Sands (1992) and Benjiamin and Brandt (1997) 
observed by using data in Northern China in the 1930s. One 
important conclusion of their studies states that income 
distribution is more equal than land distribution when family labor 
has the opportunity to access non-agricultural work.  
 
As a matter of fact, the contribution of wages to per capita income 
of farm households in rural China has increased from 22.3% in 
2000 to 30.1% in 2009
14
.This implies that using land distribution 
to approximate wealth distribution could generate misleading 
results as has been examined by Deininger & Jin (2005, 2009) 
and Wang (2006), as the equity effect of the land rental market 
means equal access to land via the land rental market. Given that 
the contribution of agricultural income to overall income 
decreased, it is more appropriate to study the effect of the land 
rental market development on income distribution, not just land 
distribution. 
 
This is clear in model (3.6)-(3.9) in which farm households can 
diversify their income sources by allocating land and labor when 
access to factor markets is possible. With endowment constraints 
and a lacking agricultural labor market, renting decisions cannot 
                                                             
13
Here we are only concerned with land used in agricultural production. We 
ignore the value of land for commercial development and other non-
agricultural uses for now. 
14
19. Data source: Summary of Rural Fixed Observation Point Survey in 
China: 2000-2009. 
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be separated from the allocation of family labor. This non-
separability reproduces a correlation between income generated 
from land rental activities and other income sources.  
 
Therefore, by studying the land rental market and income 
distribution, we firstly look at the relation between land rental 
income and other income sources. Then we analyze the effects of 
land rental income on overall income distribution. We classify 
farm household income into five components: land rental income, 
other agricultural income, income from labor migration, local off-
farm income, and other income sources (including rental income 
other than land rent, interest payments and investment income, 
pensions, husbandry income, government transfer, and all the 
other forms of income). In practice, the generalized entropy index 
is employed to measure and decompose the income inequality 
index.  
 
Other than correlations between different income sources, market 
imperfection also affects how income generated from rented land 
is distributed among farm households as suggested by Benjamin 
and Brandt (1997). Therefore, we also do a supplemented 
regression analysis to provide insight into the effects of the 
imperfect land rental market and the off-farm labor market on 
income distribution.  
 50 
 
3.4 Land rental market participation 
So far, the discussion has been particularly focused on the 
consequences of participating decisions of farm households in 
land rental market. It means that farm households have already 
solved their profit maximization problem in (3.6)-(3.9). Now we 
seek to investigate how these participating decisions were made 
by farm households.  
 
Studies in this field consist of two branches of literature. One 
branch uses the concept of “desired land area” to study which 
factors affect land rental activities (Bliss and Stern, 1982; 
Skoufias, 1995). “Desired land area” is defined as a function of 
labor, bullocks, and other non-land factors of agricultural 
production. Farm households adjust farm size to “desired land 
area” through the land rental market by renting or renting out land. 
The difference between “desired land area” and land endowment 
of farm households determines the net rent area which is positive 
for the tenant and negative for the landlord. Farm households 
whose “desired land area” is identical to the land endowment will 
not participate in the land rental market. Land rental transaction 
costs were introduced to the model to account for substantial 
non-participants. The role of transaction costs in this model is to 
prevent some farm households from adjusting their farm size to 
the desired size.  
 
Another relevant approach based on the profit maximization 
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perspective (Carter and Yao, 2002; Deininger and Jin, 2005, 
Kimura et al., 2007; Jin and Deininger, 2009; Kimura et al., 2011). 
In the basic model farm households try to maximize their profit by 
means of agricultural production and off-farm work. Thus, the 
model involves allocation of land and labor of farm households, 
rendering the concept of “desired land area” incompatible. From 
profit maximization we can derive the optimal land supply and 
demand in the land rental market, together with optimal off-farm 
labor supply. Again, transaction costs are introduced to widen the 
range of non-participants. 
 
But what these two models have in common is that they both lead 
to estimate a reduced form. Therefore, in the empirical practice 
these two methods are quite similar. For model (3.6)-(3.9), with 
slight modification, the Lagrangian for this problem is  
     1 1, ;,y O I I O OM VP F L D R R r C R r C R w T L D R
    
           

 
  
where  is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier. C  is the unit transaction 
cost and is measured by land rental market imperfection. Unit 
transaction cost is assumed to be identical for renting and renting 
out. r C  and r C  are real pay and gain for tenants and 
landlords respectively.  
 
The following analysis heavily borrows from Deininger and Jin 
(2005). We specify the first order conditions of profit maximization 
in terms of farm household type, namely rented farm households, 
rented out farm households, and farm households that do not 
 52 
 
participate in the land rental market. They all have the same first 
order condition of labor allocation, 
L yF w P                                                                                 (3.10) 
 
For farm households which rent land, the optimal condition for 
renting land is 
  0I y DR P F r C                                                               (3.11) 
 
For farm households which rent out land, the optimal condition for 
renting out land is 
  0O y DR P F r C                                                       (3.12) 
0,O OD R D R 
    
      
   
 
 
And for farm households that do not participate in the land rental 
market, its marginal productivity of land falls in the interval of
 ,r C r C   , or 
   y D yr C P F r C P                                               (3.13) 
 
r C    and r C formulate two critical points to classify farm 
households. From these first order conditions it is clear that for 
farm households which participate in the land rental market 
(rented farm households and rented out farm households), its 
marginal productivity of land is determined by the state of the art 
of agricultural production, land rent, and transaction costs. This 
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suggests that agricultural production decisions of land rental 
market participants are independent from initial land and labor 
endowment of farm households. For the farm households who do 
not participate in the land rental market, the land labor ratio 
depends on household land and labor endowment. This is the 
regime separable model suggested by Carter and Yao (2002). 
Note that the underlying assumption is that transaction costs are 
not affected by farm household factor endowment.  
 
The role of transaction costs is clear. It can enlarge or narrow the 
range of the interval in which non-participant farm households fall 
in. If transaction costs are too high, no farm household will 
participate in the land rental market. Lower transaction costs will 
stimulate land rental market participation.  
 
Equations (3.10) and (3.11) jointly determined the optimal 
operational land size for rented farm households. From these 
simultaneous equations we can solve the optimal rented land 
* * , , , , , , ,I I yR R P r C M T Vw D
 
  
 
 as a function of agricultural 
output prices, land rent, transaction cost, off farm wage, farm 
household land endowment, intermediate inputs, and capital. 
System of equations (3.10) and (3.12) produce the supply 
function for rented out farm households and optimal rented out 
land is given by
* * , , , , , , ,O O yR R P r C M T Vw D
 
  
 
. 𝑅𝑂
∗ =
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𝑅𝑂
∗ (𝑃𝑦, 𝑟, 𝐶, 𝑤, 𝐷, 𝑀, 𝑇, 𝑉) 
 
In practice, we use the first order Taylor series expansion to 
linearize 𝑅𝐼
∗ = 𝑅𝐼
∗(𝑃𝑦, 𝑟, 𝐶, 𝑤, ?̅?, 𝑀, 𝑇, 𝑉)  and 
𝑅𝑂
∗ = 𝑅𝑂
∗ (𝑃𝑦, 𝑟, 𝐶, 𝑤, ?̅?, 𝑀, 𝑇, 𝑉) for estimation. We also include 
demographic variables in empirical analysis (see Chapter 6 for 
more details).  
3.5 Further Discussion 
The above analysis is static in that we not only ignore how the 
land rental market emerged, but also neglect how the land rental 
market evolves in the process of rural economic development. In 
the following discussion, we will widen the frame of reference to 
account for these two crucial issues. 
3.5.1 Emerge and development of land rental market 
Although land sale is prohibited, the land rental market is not the 
only way to reallocate land in rural China. The other one is 
administrative land reallocation.  
 
Administrative reallocation of land has its merits. At least in terms 
of land distribution, administrative reallocation of land reaches a 
very high level of land equality. But this merit becomes less 
important when the full value of land cannot be enjoyed by 
farmers. The value of land is mostly derived from development, 
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i.e. from building factories, real estate, or other commercial 
entities (for now we just neglect the ecological and environmental 
value of land for the sake of simplification). But only a very small 
share of land development value goes to farmers, most of them 
are directly controlled by the government (see section 2.3 for 
detail). Hence, granting use rights on a piece of land to farmers is 
not very useful for reducing the income gap between rural and 
urban areas (Dollar, 2007). Even within the rural society, the 
equity effect of administrative reallocation of land becomes less 
significant as more and more families derive their income from 
the non-agricultural sector; thus reducing the resistance to 
change from administrative reallocation to the land rental market 
in terms of distribution of land.  
 
Administrative reallocation of land also worked as an informal 
social security system in rural China where the public social 
security system is not well covered (Zhang and Sun, 2009). 
Under administrative reallocation of land, every person in rural 
area gets a piece of land, so they have something they can 
depend on for their livelihood. Renting out land does not mean 
that the use right of land is lost, the use right is just rented to 
other farmers. From an economic perspective, farm households 
rent out their land in order to maximize their utility, and farmers 
can make a short-term land rental contract to avoid a potential 
long-term welfare loss. Therefore, participation in the land rental 
market would not undermine the social security role of land in 
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rural China. 
 
The transition from administrative reallocation of land to the land 
rental market as a way to transfer land may bring about 
productivity gains. Zhang et al (2011) show that land reallocation 
from the both land rental market and administrative reallocation 
increases the technical efficiency of the agricultural production, 
nonetheless the land rental market performs better.  
 
The above analysis can be summarized as follows: resistance to 
the land rental market development decreases as determining 
factors of income inequality shift from land distribution to other 
sources. The land rental market is not necessarily harmful to the 
social security role of land in rural China, and switching to the 
land rental market brings about productivity gains. These three 
factors facilitate the land rental market development in China. 
Furthermore, the role of the government cannot be ignored in the 
process of land rental market development.  
 
Apparently laws and regulations implemented in recent years in 
order to secure land use rights of farm households contribute to 
the development of the land rental market. But more importantly, 
we should note that change from administrative reallocation of 
land to the land rental market also changed who will bear 
transaction costs in land reallocation. In administrative 
reallocation, transaction costs are taken by village cadres to 
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negotiate and make contracts with farmers. In the land rental 
market, it is the farmer who bears transaction costs. Before 
abolishing agricultural quota, village leaders seek to take these 
transaction costs in order to fulfill quota missions. Consequently, 
the incentive to reallocate land administratively decreases and 
gives way to the land rental market.  
3.5.2 The Land Rental Market in the Process of Rural 
Economic Development 
 
In order to examine how the land rental market affects economic 
development, it is important to be aware of a potential 
endogenous problem.  
 
Marxism entails an endogenous theory of institutions: material 
production force (productivity) determines the relations of 
production (institutions), and the relations of production affect the 
production force (Bardhan, 1989). For an econometrician this 
clearly constitutes simultaneity or reversal causation between 
production force and relations of production.  
 
When collective farming became incompatible with the eagerness 
to improve agricultural productivity in late 1970s, collective 
farming was adjusted by means of the HRS (Du, 2006). This 
adjustment, together with the price reform and other market 
reforms, generated incentives for farmers to increase their 
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agricultural production between 1978 and 1987 (McMillan et al., 
1989; Lin, 1992). Eventually, the HRS, however, lost its clout and 
technological change accounted for most of the long-term growth 
in total factor productivity in the agricultural sector (Huang and 
Rozelle, 1996). Nonetheless, HRS might still facilitate technology 
adaptation and pave the way for long-term agricultural growth.  
 
The “inverse relationship” between farm size and productivity 
(Fan and Chan-Kang, 2005; Lipton, 2009) may justify the 
implementation of administrative reallocation, which is roughly 
matching land to labor. This is not wrong when off-farm work 
opportunities are scarce and the land rental market is almost 
absent. China’s prosperous non-agricultural sector, however, has 
largely absorbed rural labor from the agricultural sector for years. 
Labor migration from the agricultural sector to the non-agricultural 
sector causes additional problems, most notably being the 
abandoning of farms (Tan, 2001; Tang et al., 2002). Concerned 
about the waste of valuable land resources, the government 
enacted the Rural Land Contract Law in 2003 in order to regulate 
and promote the land rental market development. Then, under 
the HRS, the land rental market gradually substituted 
administrative reallocation in order to promote agricultural 
production growth.  
 
Now it is clear that the land tenure system is endogenous in the 
process of rural economic development or agricultural productivity 
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changes. Thus, to measure the impact of land rental market 
participation on agricultural productivity in this study, it is 
necessary to incorporate this potentially endogenous problem in 
the analysis.  
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Chapter 4 Land rental market and agricultural production 
efficiency 
4.1 Introduction 
Chongqing is undergoing profound social and economic structural 
changes. The agricultural sector is shrinking, but still a significant 
proportion of labor is engaged in agricultural production. 
Accompanying these changes is the persistent income 
divergence between rural and urban Chongqing.  
 
Two seminal papers which focus on structural change and 
inequality have been provided by Kuznets (1955) and Lewis 
(1954). Both of these studies suggested an inverse U-shaped 
curve of economic growth and income inequality. Although many 
empirical researchers reject such a relationship (Deininger and 
Squire, 1998; Herzer and Vollmer, 2012), structural change as a 
major source of inequality cannot be ignored (Aizenmen, 2012). 
 
In such a transition economy, developing a well-functioning land 
and labor market is crucial for most people living in a rural area 
because land and labor are their most precious endowments 
which can generate income. A functioning land rental market was 
considered as an effective instrument to transform the rural 
economy from an unproductive to a productive and efficient one 
 61 
 
(Rozelle, et al, 2002; Kimura, et al., 2007). This belief comes from 
the doctrine of neoclassical economics that any exchange of land 
will improve the efficiency of use by competitive bidding to gain 
contracts (Rothenberger and Truffer, 2003). Hence, in the 
equilibrium of a competitive land rental market, technical 
efficiency can be realized since prices will provide the correct 
incentives and signals to producers to equal marginal rates of 
technical substitution. A perfect land rental market improves 
technical efficiency; however, in developing countries such a 
market does not exist because of informational asymmetry, 
informal contract, and unclearly defined land rights.  
 
Farm households in the area of field research featured as mall 
farm size, relatively active land rental participation and large scale 
labor migration. Nevertheless, the land rental market in China 
was characterized by large numbers of incomplete contracts (oral 
contract) and gift transfers (zero rent) (Ye, et al., 2006). After 
having introduced data sources in section 4.2, we analyze the 
land rental market conditions in rural Chongqing in detail in 
section 4.3. As we will see later, market imperfection in this region 
is obvious. Then we look at how the land rental market 
imperfections affect agricultural production efficiency from a new 
institutional economics perspective. We also provide further 
evidence to show the relationship between the land rental market 
and agricultural production efficiency.  
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In section 4.4, we develop Bayesian procedures for stochastic 
production frontier analysis. After having obtained the technical 
efficiency level of farm households, the two hypotheses (H1 and 
H2) are tested in 4.5. In section 4.6 we discuss the implications of 
this analysis. 
4.2 Data description 
Data used in this study is a combination of two sources. To 
describe the land rental market environment in rural Chongqing, 
we use our own survey data in three villages (Tianba village, 
Changshui village, and Xiehe village) of Chongqing in 2011 
(Data-1). Data used for analysis of the impact of the land rental 
market on technical efficiency came from a survey conducted by 
a fixed observation point of the Research Center for Rural 
Economy (RCRE) of China in the same three villages (Data-2). 
Data-1 comprises data of 135 households, mainly focuses on 
their land endowment and land rental market participation. Data-2 
constitutes a of 94 farm households from 2003-2006, and 2008-
2010. We use a one output and four inputs production function. 
Output is the aggregate value of grain crop, cash crop, and 
livestock, measured in Yuan. Inputs are aggregated labor (days), 
capital (measured in Yuan), land (sown area), and intermediate 
input of crop production activities of farm household as we have 
mentioned before. All the monetary valued variables were 
deflated to the price of 2003.The sample data were deflated by 
the sample mean of each variable so that the mean of data used 
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in the estimation had a sample mean of 1. A summary of the data 
used in the stochastic frontier analysis can be found in Appendix 
table-4.  
4.3 Land Rental Market and Agricultural Production 
Efficiency: Descriptive Analysis 
In spite of the importance of the land rental market in China, not 
too much attention was paid to the structure of the market itself, 
which is characterized by contract completeness, trading partners, 
and land rent. As explained below, all these factors crucially 
related to the technical efficiency impact of the land rental market 
through transaction costs.  
 
Transaction costs were modeled as an additional “production” 
cost in the neoclassical model (Deininger and Jin, 2005; Jin and 
Deininger, 2009). As explained by Furubotn and Richter (2005, pp. 
64-71), such an approach neglects the details of the market 
structure and assumes a perfectly rational decision-maker, thus 
contradicting the basic assumption of NIE (new institutional 
economics): bounded rationality, opportunism, and risk aversion 
(Chiles and McMackin, 1996). More importantly, the attempts of 
decision-making units to minimize transaction costs and the 
implications of the resulting market transaction outcomes have 
not been studied.  
 
In this section, we employ the tools of NIE to analyze the 
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structure of the land rental market in rural Chongqing. To do this, 
we assume the farm households are characterized by bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and risk aversion. The referring data 
comes from three villages (Changshui, Tianba, and Xiehe) in 
Chongqing in 2011. The relevant information pertaining to the 
land rental market in this area was listed in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1 Summary of the rental market in three villages 
Village 
Tianba Changshui Xiehe 
Nobs Nobs Nobs 
Households 45 48 42 
Tenant 12 26 3(3) 
Landlord 16 8 34(1) 
Contract     
Oral 10 29 4(4) 
Paper 18 5 33(0) 
Trading partner    
Acquaintance 21 34 4(4) 
Non-acquaintance 7 0 33(0) 
Rent    
Zero 18 25 4(4) 
Payment 10 9 33(0) 
Farm size Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Before rental 4.94 1.73 5.38 2.25 3.23 1.86 
After rental 4.75 3.90 8.07 6.04 1.77 1.87 
Rent area 1.41 2.98 3.30 5.39 0.08 0.46 
Rent-out area 1.32 2.06 0.54 1.28 1.56 1.39 
*The numbers in parentheses in the last column count transactions between farms in 
all transactions in Xiehe. The numbers listed under Tianba and Changshui are 
transactions between farm households.Data source: author’s own survey. 
 
In the sample, almost half (48.9%) of the farm households 
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participated in the land rental market
15
. One of the characteristics 
of the land rental market in rural Chongqing was that nearly two 
thirds (65.2%) of the rental contracts were made in oral form. 
Another feature was that most of the land rental transactions 
(83.3%) were conducted between acquaintances and 71.2% of 
the land transactions were free transfer
16
. These results are joint 
products of high transaction costs in transferring land and efforts 
by participants to reduce transaction costs. 
 
A land transaction starts with searching for a suitable partner and 
this process is not cost-free. Searching and information costs 
correlate positively with the asymmetry of information. While most 
rental transactions in this study are small-scale transactions, 
these costs are not trivial for participants of the land rental market. 
Dealing with acquaintances is a way to reduce search and 
information costs, since mutual trust between landlords and 
tenants can reduce transaction cost (Holden and Ghebru, 2005). 
Therefore, on the one hand, trading partners are more likely to be 
acquaintances in order to reduce transaction cost. On the other 
hand, renting out land to relatives and friends before leaving has 
been proven efficient to prospective labor migrants. Under these 
circumstances, land rental transactions are not conducted 
                                                             
15
Here we are only interested in land rental transactions between farm 
households. Most land rental transactions in Xiehe villages were between 
farm households and non-agricultural units, like school, factories and village 
utilities. Transactions like this were not included in our analysis. 
16
“Acquaintances” means that transaction partners of a land rental had prior 
social ties based on kinship or friendship. 
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through competitive bidding, which means that the tenant may not 
be the one who can provide the highest rent (in several cases, 
the rent is zero). In this case the land rental transaction is not 
orientated towards technical efficiency but, much rather, towards 
reducing transaction costs. Therefore, by trading with 
acquaintances, market transaction efficiency may be improved, 
but it is not clear whether in agricultural production technical 
efficiency can be improved. 
 
Previous concerns about land contract forms mainly focused on 
fixed rental contracts and sharecropping (Shaban, 1987; Ray, 
1998), while the degree of completeness of rental contracts 
receives little attention in the research of rural land rental markets. 
As suggested by Furubotn and Richter (2005), a contract is 
incomplete due to bounded rationality of participants as it is 
impossible to elaborate every detail of a contract as well as 
uncertainties regarding the future. Establishing a detailed land 
rental contract is time-consuming and increases transaction costs. 
In many cases, a detailed and formal contract can facilitate 
enforcement and supervision. However, at community level, when 
enforcement and supervision of contracts can be based on 
reputation or social capital, trading partners are tempted to make 
informal contracts (Edwards and Ogilvie, 2012). This informal 
relationship could be stable, because the participants of a land 
transfer do not just engage in one time trade. In the long run, they 
are interdependent regarding  many aspects of social life, their 
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strategic actions should be perceived as pertaining to a dynamic 
equilibrium result (for example in the rural financial market in 
China Zhu et al. (1997)). In this dynamic game, they will maintain 
cooperation in order to maximize long-term benefits. Therefore, 
oral contracts might be motivated by minimizing long-term 
transaction costs. 
 
Landlords have an additional motivation to make an oral contract, 
especially when the landlord or family members of the landlord 
engage in labor migration. For the uncertainty which off-farm jobs 
entail and the lack of unemployment insurances for migrating 
agricultural laborers, migrated laborers may be forced to return to 
their village in case of unemployment. Considering this 
unemployment risk, landlords prefer to make an informal and 
flexible contract with a tenant in order to be able to reclaim the 
land easily, which may limit the landlord’s ability to negotiate a 
high rent. Hence, the landlord may refrain from searching for a 
competitive tenant. In table 4.2, we classified farm households 
into 12 categories based on their occupational choices and land 
rental market participation
17
. Farm households with labor 
migration participate actively in both sides of the land rental 
                                                             
17
 In table 2, “Farmer” denotes farm households which are only engaged in 
agricultural production , “Part-time farmer without labor migration” refers to a 
family that has agricultural laborers and laborers which were employed 
within the county, but no out-of county labor migration, “Part-time farmer with 
labor migration” refers to farm households which not only operated 
agricultural production but also have out-of county labor migration; moreover, 
they may have family labor working off-farm within the county, “Non-Farmer 
without migration” and “Non-farmer with migration” is defined in the same 
manner as part-time farmer only without agricultural labor. 
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market. 12 out of 19 rented farm households are subject to labor 
migration, which also holds for approximately the same proportion 
of rented out farm households (61.82%)
18
. Most likely both 
landlord and tenant are well informed about the risks involved in 
labor migration.  
Table 4.2 Land rental market participation and occupation of 
farm households 
 
Rent 
in  
Do not 
participate 
Rent 
out Sum 
Farmer 2 
(1.89) 
9 
(8.49) 
4 
(3.77) 
15 
(14.15) 
Part-time farmer without migration 5 
(4.72) 
6 
(5.66) 
5 
(4.72) 
16 
(15.09) 
Part-time farmer with migration 12 
(11.32) 
17 
(16.04) 
11 
(10.38) 
40 
(37.74) 
Non-farmer without migration 0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
12 
(11.32) 
12 
(11.32) 
Non-farmer with migration 0 
(0.00) 
0 
(0.00) 
23 
(21.70) 
23 
(21.70) 
Sum 19 
(17.92
) 
32 
(30.19) 
55 
(51.89) 
106   
(100.00) 
Note: this table lists farm household occupational choices and participation in the land 
rental market in 2010. Figures in parentheses denote the number of households in each 
category. Figures in parentheses denote the percentage of each category. Data source: 
RCRE. 
 
The opportunism of landlords increases the chance of 
renegotiation after land transactions which may decrease the 
expectation of returns from investment. Claiming revenues from 
agricultural production is particularly time-consuming. Thus, 
assets specificity and uncertainty about the future may prevent 
                                                             
18
The percentage is calculated by using the total number of labor migrants 
(11+23), divided by total number of rented out farm households (55). 
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tenants from investing in rented land, and cannot benefit from the 
technical efficiency enhancing effect of land rental. All of these 
factors will reduce the tenant’s willingness to pay and, therefore, 
lower the price for rental in equilibrium. Furthermore, 
informational asymmetry increases the tenant’s risk when dealing 
with an unfamiliar landlord and constraints him or her to trade 
with acquaintances. 
 
Participants of the land rental market in these three villages 
attempt to minimize transaction costs in an environment of 
informational asymmetry, and try to mitigate risks from off-farm 
work uncertainty. All this leads to a land rental market 
characterized by oral contract, acquaintance trading, and zero 
rent. And these reactions may undermine the efficiency-
enhancing effect of the land rental market. 
 
Apart from the possible impact of the market environment, there 
are other channels through which the land rental market may 
affect agricultural production efficiency. Firstly, the land rental 
market may affect agricultural production through the impact on 
land fragmentation. Empirical studies show that land 
fragmentation in China leads to agricultural productivity losses 
(Fleisher and Liu, 1992; Nguyen et al, 1996; Tan et al, 2006, 
2008).The land rental market provides farm households with the 
opportunity to reduce land fragmentation by renting and improve 
agricultural production efficiency. We depict changes of average 
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land plot size and average number of plots cultivated by farm 
households in the three villages from 2003 to 2006, and 2008-
2010 in Figure 4.1. The average land plot size in these villages 
increased from 0.53 mu in 2003 to 0.65 mu in 2010, and the 
number of plots per household decreased from 6.84 plots in 2003 
to 6.48 plots in 2010. Even though these changes are rather 
marginal, they are nonetheless pertaining to the impact of the 
land rental market, considering that during this time period there 
was no administrative reallocation of land in these villages. 
Figure 4.1 Change of Average Plot Size and Number of Plots 
per Household 
 
 
 
Secondly, the land rental market has the potential to save the loss 
of productivity due to agricultural labor migration. The new 
economics of labor migration highlight the complexity of the effect 
6
6.2
6.4
6.6
6.8
7
7.2
7.4
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010
Average plot size
Average number of plots
A
v
erag
e P
lo
t size (m
u
) 
A
v
erag
e n
u
m
b
er o
f p
lo
ts 
Year 
Data source: RCRE 
 71 
 
of migration of agricultural labor on agricultural productivity (Stark, 
1991). On the one hand, loss of labor due to migration may have 
a negative impact on productivity given production technology; on 
the other hand, remittances from migration can relax capital 
constraints on agricultural production and therefore increase 
investments which can compensate for the negative effect of 
losing farm labor. The overall impact of migration on agricultural 
productivity is ambiguous and depends on which of the two 
above-mentioned trends is dominant.  
Figure 4.2 Development of the land rental market and labor 
migration in three villages from 2004 to 2010 
 
Data source: RCRE 
 
An empirical study on northern China has shown that the impact 
of migration on maize production was negative by using Stark’s 
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framework (Rozelle, et al, 1999). Therefore, the land rental 
market has a productivity enhancing effect by allowing tenants to 
exploit the land which was only marginally exploited by landlords 
whose labor migrated out (Jin and Deininger, 2009). As illustrated 
in figure 4.2, a positive correlation between the land rental market 
participation and agricultural labor migration may imply a 
productivity enhancing effect on the land rental market in the field 
research area. 
 
Agricultural production may also benefit from economies of scale 
through the land rental market. Land transaction between 
migrated households and non-migrated households should 
indicate a concentration of operational farm size. In figure 4.3we 
depict operational land distribution before and after land rental in 
2011 by means of the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient. Farm 
size before rental is denoted by land contracted from village 
collectives, and farm size after rental is denoted by the actual 
operational area. We can see in Figure 4.3 that land holding is 
concentrated through land rental transactions as the Gini 
coefficient increased from 0.25 to 0.48. 
 
Therefore, in rural Chongqing we observed both negative and 
positive effects of the land rental market on agricultural 
production efficiency. On the one hand, an incomplete land rental 
market environment may reduce the incentive of tenants to invest 
and maximize work load and may prevent land match with the 
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potentially most productive farm households; both of these factors 
tend to lower production efficiency. On the other, land rental 
transaction could save the loss of productivity due to labor 
migration and land fragmentation. Through the land rental market 
it is also possible to establish economies of scale. The overall 
impact of these factors is the focus of the following empirical 
research. 
Figure 4.3 Lorenz Curves of land distribution before and after 
land transaction 
 
Data source: author’s own survey.  
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allocative efficiency), technical efficiency is defined as the ability 
to produce as much output as possible from a given bundle of 
inputs and technology (Farrell, 1957). Technical efficiency is 
defined in relative terms, relative to the theoretical maximum 
output from given input mix and technology. This is the output-
oriented technical efficiency measurement, in contrast to the 
input-oriented technical efficiency measurement. Allocative 
efficiency refers to the ability to maximize profits or minimize 
costs in production. Without a doubt, the management level of a 
farm affects the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. But 
to achieve allocative efficiency it is important to have a well-
functioning and competitive input and output market, so price 
information can be transferred to farmers freely (imperfect market 
structure, informational asymmetry and transaction costs are 
potential obstacles). It implies that not only management skills but 
also market conditions which are beyond the control of farm 
household impact allocative efficiency. To measure allocative 
inefficiency formally we need to estimate a production function 
plus a demand system or a cost function and derived demand 
system (Greene, 2008, pp. 96). Limited information on all relevant 
input and output markets restrict our ability to investigate the 
relationship between allocative efficiency and the land rental 
market participation. But we can explore the relationship between 
technical efficiency and land rental market participation by 
focusing on the production function, and we will do it in a 
stochastic production frontier framework.  
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Stochastic frontier analysis was initially developed by Aigner, 
Lovell and Schmidt (1977) as well Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977) independently. The application of the Bayesian analysis in 
stochastic frontier analysis was introduced by van den Broeck et 
al (1994) for its advantage in taking account of parameter 
uncertainties. 
 
In this study, we employ a generalized true random effect model 
(GTRE) for stochastic frontier analysis (Tsionas and Kumbahakar, 
2012). This model has the form 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖                                            (4.1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the output of farm households𝑖(𝑖 = 1, … , 𝐼) at year 
𝑡(𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇) . 𝑥𝑖𝑡  denotes the input matrix. 𝛽  is the parameter 
vector of the production function. 𝛼𝑖  represents a farm specific 
effect which is time-persistent, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 denotes the stochastic error of 
production, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is time-varying technical efficiency and 𝑧𝑖 is time-
persistent technical inefficiency. Colombi et al (2011) and Tsionas 
and Kumbahakar (2012) provide examples and intuitions to 
formulate such a general form of a stochastic frontier model. It is 
reasonable to assume that management may change over time, 
even though some managing skills are time invariants. Because 
of the inefficiency related to management, it is also reasonable to 
assume that technical inefficiency has a time-varying part and a 
persistent part. 
 
Economic theory suggests that the production function 𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) 
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should be a monotonic and concave function on inputs, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 
(Chambers, 1998). Furthermore, as we have mentioned before, 
the production function should have constant returns to scale. 
Sauer et al. (2006) and O’Donnell and Coelli (2005) 
demonstrated the importance of imposing these regularity 
conditions in estimating the stochastic frontier model in the 
Frequentist as well in the Bayesian context respectively. The 
requirement of these regularity conditions on functional 
coefficients depends on which empirical form of production 
function we choose. 
 
Here, we employ the translog production function to approximate 
the true production function in (4.1). The translog production 
function has the form, 
𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑗 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑘 
𝑗, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛  denote inputs. And also left hand side of (4.1) 
changes correspondingly to 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 . The translog version of 
production function (4.1) is therefore 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑗 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑛
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑘 + 𝛼𝑖 +
𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖                                                                              (4.2) 
 
Taking the exponent to both sides of the function (4.2) we have 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽))𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝑖)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑣𝑖𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖) 
in which 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽))𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝑖)𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑣𝑖𝑡)  indicates the theoretical 
maximum output (𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ ) produced from the given input mix and 
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technology. 𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗⁄ = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖)  measures the proportion of 
actual output 𝑦𝑖𝑡 as the theoretical maximum output, which means 
that 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖) is the index of the technical efficiency level of 
farm households. We denote 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖)  as the technical 
efficiency score of farm households. If a farm household is 
technically efficient, its technical efficiency score is 1, which 
implies that 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖) = 1 or −𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖 = 0, i.e. production of 
farm household lies on the stochastic production frontier. As the 
technical efficiency of farm households decreases, the technical 
efficiency score approaches to 0. Note that 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖) 
approximates 0 as −𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖  goes to negative infinite, which 
means that 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖) ∈ (0, 1].  
 
Constant return to scale (homogeneity) in inputs implies that 
∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 = 1, and ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘
𝑛
𝑗=1 = 0.  
 
𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽)is monotonic (marginal output of input is positive) in 𝑥𝑖𝑡 
implies,  
, ,
1 1, , , ,
ln
ln 0 ln 0
ln
n n
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y y y y
x x
x x x x
   
 
   
       
   
               (4.3) 
 
𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) is concave (marginal output of input is non-increasing 
function of input) in 𝑥𝑖𝑡 if and only if the Hessian matrix 𝐻  of 
𝐹(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝛽) is negative semi-definite. The hessian matrix is given by: 
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𝐻 = [
𝐹11 … 𝐹1𝑛
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐹𝑛1 … 𝐹𝑛𝑛
] 
where 
𝐹𝑗𝑘 =
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑗𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑘
(𝛽𝑗𝑘 + (𝛽𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑛
𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑘) (𝛽𝑘 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑛
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑗))
−
𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑗2
(𝛽𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑛
𝑛
𝑘=1
𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑘)
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑗
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑘
 
for 𝑗, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑛 . 
, , 1it j it kx x   for 𝑗 = 𝑘 , or 0 otherwise. 𝐻  is 
negative semi-definite if and only if the sign of the first leading 
principal minor is not positive, i.e. |𝐹11| ≤ 0, and the signs of the 
further leading principal minors alternate, i.e. 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛|𝐻𝑗| = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(−1)
𝑗 or |𝐻𝑗| = 0, for 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝑛                     (4.4) 
 
Other than homogeneity, monotonicity and concavity not only 
depend on the estimated parameters, but also depend on the 
sample data used for estimating the production function. Except 
for several specific functional forms (e.g. Cobb-Douglas 
production function, CES (constant elasticity of substitution) 
production function), we cannot know whether the estimated 
parameters will or will not satisfy regularity conditions a priori. The 
homogeneity conditions can be imposed simply by using one 
input to normalize the translog production function first. Because 
no information about the error term is needed in the curvature 
conditions, we can test it by performing an ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimation on the normalized model. Here we use 
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intermediate input as a normalizer. The results are presented in 
table 4.3
19
.  
Table 4.3 OLS estimation of stochastic frontier model 
Output Coef. Std.Err. T P>|t|   [95%  Conf.  Interval] 
𝛽1(logc*) 0,0753 0.0157 4,8 0.000 0.0445 0.1061 
𝛽2(logld*) 0.4316 0.0279 15.42 0.000 0.3767 0.4866 
𝛽3(loglb*)  0.1514 0.0267 5,67 0.000 0.0990 0.2038 
𝛽11(logcc) -0.0242 0.0094 -1.29 0.197 -0.0306 0.0063 
𝛽12(logcld) -0,0077 0.0251 -0.31 0.759 -0.0569 0.0416 
𝛽13(logclb) 0.1293 0.0181 7,15 0.000 0.0938 0.1648 
𝛽22(logldd) -0,1898 0.0261 -3.64 0.000 -0.1462 -0.0439 
𝛽23(logldb) 0,0492 0.0345 1,42 0.155 -0.0186 0.1170 
𝛽33(loglbb) -0.0458 0.0198 -1.16 0.245 -0.0618 0.0158 
𝛽𝑡(time) -0.0008 0.0173 -0.05 0.962 -0.0347 0.0331 
𝛽𝑡𝑡(time2) 0.0039 0.0023 1,74 0.083 -0.0005 0.0085 
Note: *c represents capital, ld denotes land, lb is labor. 
 
Greene (1980) has shown that the OLS estimator provides a 
consistent and best linear unbiased estimate of 𝛽  in the 
stochastic frontier model. Even though the intercept parameter 𝛼 
is not consistently estimated by OLS, we can get a correct 
regularity conditions assessment because 𝛼was not included in 
regularity conditions. Therefore OLS results are sufficient for us to 
evaluate the regularity conditions of the underlying production 
function. First we assess monotonic and concave conditions at 
                                                             
19
We conduct this estimation in the way of the fixed effect model, i.e. we 
firstly eliminate αi  by demeaning the variables using the within 
transformation, then we perform the OLS estimation on the transformed data. 
Therefore, only slope parameters were included in Table 4.3. 
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the data mean. Because we have deflated the sample data to 
make each variable have a sample mean of one, the derivative 
(4.3) reduce to 𝛽𝑗 when evaluated at data mean. 𝛽𝑗 ≥ 0 indicates 
the fulfillment of monotonicity conditions. The OLS estimations of 
𝛽𝑗  in Table 4.3 are all positive, which implies that monotonicity 
constraints are satisfied at data mean. At the sample mean, 
𝐹𝑗𝑘 collapses to , ,jk j k j it j it kx x       . The corresponding 
leading principal minors are |𝐻1| = −0.4351 , |𝐻2| = 0.0627 , 
|𝐻3| = 0.0036 , and |𝐻4| = 0.0000 . Because |𝐻3|  is positive, the 
OLS estimator violates concave conditions at sample mean. 
Therefore, some structures must be placed on the production 
frontier estimation. 
 
We employ the Bayesian procedure in stochastic frontier analysis 
because it is straightforward to impose monotonic and concave 
conditions in estimation by simply using prior information 
(O’Donnell et al, 1999). Moreover, it has good finite-sample 
properties with small 𝐼  and 𝑇  compared to the maximum 
likelihood estimation (Tsionas and Kumbahakar, 2012). The 
details of the Bayesian MCMC inference in the GTRE model were 
presented in Appendix I. 
 
Our aim is to see the effect of the land rental activities on 
technical efficiency. Firstly, we focus on testing H1 which can be 
pursued by addressing two questions: 1. Can land rental markets 
transfer land from LFHs to MFHs? 2. Can participation in land 
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rental markets improve the technical efficiency of production for 
farm households? We can answer the first question by comparing 
the willingness to pay for an additional unit of land (i.e. the value 
of the marginal product of land) between LFHs and MFHs. If the 
willingness to pay at MFHs is higher than at LFHs, a competitive 
land rental market can transfer land from LFHs to MFHs because 
MFHs can provide higher rents. Even though transaction costs 
were involved, MFHs are more likely to overcome the restriction 
of transaction costs to rent a piece of land. But if transaction costs 
are too high, any efficiency enhancing transaction could be 
blocked. As a reaction to significant transaction costs, farmers 
may want to negotiate land rental with their acquaintances even 
though the potential tenant cannot provide the highest bidding for 
land. Therefore, even if MFHs will pay more for an additional unit 
of land, it not necessarily means that MFHs can actually rent land 
when transaction costs are sufficiently high, but it still shows the 
potential of a competitive land rental market. 
 
To answer the second question, we estimate the impact of the 
participation in the land rental market on the technical efficiency 
score of farm households as we are trying to explain the mean of 
exp(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖) by a bundle of explanatory variables in which the 
participation in the land rental market is the key explaining 
variable. 
 
Here we use the ratio of absolute value of net-rented land to land 
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endowment of farm households as an indicator of participation in 
the land rental market of farm households (𝑃𝑖𝑡). Suppose the net-
rented land for farm households𝑖 at time 𝑡 is 𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is positive for 
renting land and negative for renting out land. Land endowment 
of farm households is given by ?̅?𝑖. Then 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
|𝑅𝑖𝑡|
?̅?𝑖
 
 
The marginal effect of 𝑃𝑖𝑡  on exp(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖)  is given by the 
coefficient of 𝑃𝑖𝑡  in regression. Denote 𝐸(exp(−𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖))  by 
𝐸(𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡), the efficiency function can be elaborated as 
𝐸(𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0𝑖 + 𝛼1𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐹𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼6𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡                                                                               (4.5) 
where 𝐻𝑖𝑡  is the Herfindahl index which measures cultivate 
diversity, 𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the number of plots cultivated by farm households 
which was used to measure land fragmentation, 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 denotesthe 
age of household heads. 𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 (𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡⁄ ) , where 𝐹𝑀𝑖𝑡 
denotes expenditure on the use of farm machines and 𝐴𝑃𝑖𝑡 
denotes expenditure on use of animal power.𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 is farm size of 
farm household. As we use a point estimation of 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡  (the 
expectation) as dependent variable, and we do not have prior 
information about the parameters in (4.5), in addition we do not 
need to impose monotonic and curvature conditions in (4.5), so 
we just use the traditional Frequentist method to estimate (4.5). It 
should be noted that we estimate (4.2) and (4.5) separately. This 
two-step procedure which has its genuine drawbacks (Wang and 
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Schmidt, 2002) permits us to maintain the assumption that 
technical inefficiency consist of a persistent part and a time 
varying part
20
.  
 
In chapter 3 we discussed the endogenous relationship between 
land rental market development and agricultural production 
efficiency change. In function 4.5 this endogenous relationship 
constitutes the inverse causality between 𝐸(𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡) and 𝑃𝑖𝑡. In this 
study we use 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 , degree of participation in the land rental 
market in the last period, as an instrumental variable for 𝑃𝑖𝑡. The 
current state of the technical efficiency level of farm households 
will not affect land rental market participation in the last period, 
and as we will show in Table 6.2, farm household participation in 
the current period is closely related to participation in the last 
period. These make 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 a qualified instrumental variable for 𝑃𝑖𝑡. 
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Stochastic frontier analysis 
In the estimation we generate 70,000 draws by using the 
Metropolis-within-Gibbs algorithm as discussed in Appendix I. 
                                                             
20
In the Bayesian context, based on the assumption of 𝜔𝑖𝑡, we are able to 
derive the likelihood function of E(TEit) as a function of explanatory variables 
in 4.5. Combining with the prior of TEit, we can derive the posterior of TEit. 
However, we did not do this in our analysis because we have to make an 
assumption about the distribution of 1/𝛾 + 1/𝜂𝑡 instead of 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡, which means 
we have to give up the assumption about the distinction between time 
varying technical inefficiency and persistent technical inefficiency. 
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The first 20,000 draws were discarded as “burn-in” to eliminate 
the effects of initial values. In table 4.4 we list the mean of the 
marginal posterior distributions of the parameters in the translog 
production frontier function, together with the 90% highest 
probability density (HPD) interval. Convergence diagnosis (CD) of 
the Metropolis-within-Gibbs algorithm was implemented by using 
the procedure of Geweke (1992). 
Table 4.4 Posterior estimation of slope parameters 
Stochastic frontier production function 
Parameters 
Posterior 
mean 
90% HPD* 
Geweke’s 
CD 
𝛽0 0.3650 (0.1736,0.5578) 0.6314 
𝛽1(logc) 0.1772 (0.1229,0.2323) 0.4879 
𝛽2(logld) 0.3963 (0.3272,0.4647) -0.2049 
𝛽3(loglb)  0.1947 (0.1416,0.2575) 0.6072 
𝛽11(logcc) -0.0063 (-0.0251,0.0127) 0.6747 
𝛽12(logcld) -0.0029 (-0.0452,0.0372) -1.5399 
𝛽13(logclb) -0.0055 (-0.0328,0.0173) 0.6519 
𝛽22(logldd) -0.0128 (-0.0571,0.0271) -0.0198 
𝛽23(logldb) 0.0768 (0.0525,0.1005) 0.1986 
𝛽33(loglbb) 0.0046 
(-
0.0116,0.02047) 
-0.6797 
𝛽𝑡(time) -0.3005 
(-0.3067,-
0.2944) 
0.2255 
𝛽𝑡𝑡(time2) 0.2132 (0.1965,0.2294) -0.9042 
Posterior predictive p-value 0,2484 
*HPD stands for highest probability density interval. 
 
We present the posterior mean of five farm households whose 
technical efficiency score is ranking from low to high and its 
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composition in table 4.5 to exemplify the structure of technical 
inefficiency. These farm households include the most technically 
efficient farm household and the least technically efficient farm 
household and three farm households who equally divide total 
farm households into four groups according to their technical 
efficiency score. We demonstrate the total technical efficiency 
score and its compositions in each farm household. Total 
technical efficiency equals the persistent technical efficiency 
multiplied with the time-varying technical efficiency. 
Table 4.5 Technical efficiency score* 
Farm 
household 
Persistent 
technical efficiency 
Time varying 
technical efficiency 
Total technical 
efficiency 
1         0.456 0.91       0.417 
 
 
(0.326,0.669) (0.778,0.993) (0.253,0.664) 
2 0.567 0.907       0.541 
 
 
(0.433,0.847) (0.776,0.993) (0.336,0.841) 
3 0.681 0.912       0.621 
 
 
(0.498,0.927) (0.777,0.994) (0.387,0.921) 
4 0.832 0.93       0.774 
 
 
(0.634,0.987) (0.812,0.995) (0.514,0.982) 
5 0.979 0.956       0.936 
 
 
(0.937,0.999) (0.883,0.997) (0.827,0.996) 
*Numbers in parentheses are 90% highest probability density interval. 
 
In table 4.5 we can see that the major source of technical 
inefficiency was attributed to persistent technical inefficiency. 
Time-varying technical efficiency shows is approximating to 1 and 
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no big difference between farm households. It is the divergence 
of persistent technical inefficiency which leads to vast differences 
in the efficiency score
21
. In this context, Figure 4.4 demonstrates 
the kernel estimation of the posterior mean of technical efficiency 
and its components of farm households in the sample. Clearly, 
the distribution of technical efficiency of farm households mainly 
depends on the kernel density of the posterior mean of persistent 
technical efficiency.  
Figure 4.4 Kernel estimation of persistent, transient and total 
technical efficiency 
 
 
Our interest is not in technical inefficiency per se but in the 
relationship between technical inefficiency and land rental market 
                                                             
21
 The figures in the row of “Time varying technical efficiency” were the mean 
of this variable over time. 
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participation. We have already constructed a functional 
relationship for these two variables in equation (4.5). As we have 
a time-varying and time-invariant technical inefficiency element, 
we are going to discuss how land rental market participation can 
affect these technical inefficiencies.  
 
Persistent technical inefficiency is varying among individuals but 
not across time, so individual characteristics which are not 
changing over time may correlate closely with persistent technical 
inefficiency; even though farm household participation in the land 
rental market remains relatively constant from the last period to 
the present (the probability is around 0.7 as it is shown in Table 
6.2). As time passes by, the probability of farm households to 
change their rental behavior is increasing. It may imply that in the 
panel data model in which time is long, the correlation between 
persistent technical efficiency and land rental market participation 
may be weak. But we should also note that as the time dimension 
in panel data is increasing, the assumption of persistent technical 
inefficiency becomes inappropriate. 
 
The above discussion suggests that land rental market 
participation might correlate more tightly with the time varying 
technical inefficiency. Variation of the time-varying technical 
inefficiency among individuals is small, and variation of 
individual’s time-varying technical inefficiency across time is also 
relatively small compared to the variation of persistent technical 
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inefficiency among individuals. Therefore, we may expect that the 
impact of land rental market participation on technical inefficiency 
(vertical effect) should be small, at least in the short term. 
4.5.2 The efficiency function 
As previously introduced, our research objectives are aiming at 
examining the “vertical” and “horizontal” effects of land rental 
market participation. First, we look into the vertical effect by 
estimating (4.5). We use the fixed effect model for our estimation 
(the Hausman test shows that the fixed effect model is preferable). 
The results are listed in table 4.6.  
 
The results show that the impact of land rental on the total 
technical efficiency is positive, but insignificant. This may suggest 
that participating in the land rental market has the potential to 
improve technical production efficiency, but the gain is marginal, 
indicating that a land rental market environment which is 
characterized by widespread informal contracts (oral contract), 
acquaintances transactions, and gift transfer of land (no explicit 
monetary rent) cannot provide enough incentives for farmers to 
improve their management skills. The impact of land 
fragmentation is insignificant, too. Therefore, reduced land 
fragmentation through land rental market may not bring about a 
technical efficiency gain. But the implications of farm size are 
significant, indicating that increased farm size can improve farm 
households’ technical efficiency. Though participation in the land 
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rental market may not lead to an increase in technical efficiency, 
expansion of farm size through land rental, however, does. 
Diversifying farm cultivation has a significant and positive effect 
on technical efficiency of farm households as indicated by the 
coefficient of the Herfindal index. Household head age and 
agricultural machinery use in production have no significant effect 
on technical efficiency in this sample.  
Table 4.6Estimation of slope parameters in the efficiency function 
 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡                                  
Variables  Coeffficients Standard error 
Constant 0.0575  0.0441  
Herfindal index 0.8232***  0.0829  
Extent of participation in 
land rental market (%) 
0.2490 0.2817 
Household head age -0.0005   0.0005   
Machinery -0.0234  0.0204  
Number of plots 0.0028  0.0052  
Farm size (mu) 0.1183***  0.0144  
R2  0.4793  
Note: 
*
Statistically significant at the 10%-level. **Statistically 
significant at the 5%-level. ***Statistically significant at the 1%-
level. 
 
One important conclusion for the following analysis of the 
“horizontal” level is that the correlation between land rental 
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market participation and the individual technical inefficiency level 
can be ignored. We will further discuss the significance of this 
conclusion in the following analysis. 
4.5.3 Investigation of “horizontal” effect 
We calculated the value of the marginal product of land, i.e. the 
shadow price of land. We group farm households into three 
categories according their technical efficiency score: less efficient 
farm households (LFHs), moderately efficient farm households 
(EFHs), and more efficient farm households (MFHs) (The farm 
households are divided equally into three groups). Then we use 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test if the shadow price of land is 
higher for MFHs than for the other two groups. The results of 
ANOVA were presented in Table 4.7. A very small p value 
indicates that differences between the three groups are highly 
significant, which implies that the shadow price of land of more 
efficient farm households is higher than moderate and less 
efficient farm households. Therefore, in a competitive land rental 
market, land will be transferred to more efficient farm households, 
and land use efficiency will be improved. But as we have 
described previously, informal land rental contracts, informational 
asymmetry, and gift transferring are prevalent in land rental 
market in field research area. Such a market environment may 
prevent the transfer of land efficiently, as will be seen. 
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Table 4.7 ANOVA of shadow price by efficiency group 
Group less efficient  moderate efficient more efficient 
Mean 269.24 354.47 555.56 
Std.  55.61 23.24   187.24 
ANOVA results 
Source SS df MS F Prob>F 
Groups 1213524.9 2 606762.5 52.79 0.0000 
Error 988531 91 11494.5 
  
Total 2202056 93 
    
In this study, we demonstrate the completeness of the land rental 
market by comparing the difference between shadow price of 
land and observed land rent. We use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test (K-S test) to examine whether the shadow price of land and 
observed land rent are from two different distributions. We do the 
same for the shadow price of labor and observed off-farm labor 
wage. The results are presented in Table 4.8. Both tests reject the 
null hypothesis that the shadow price of land and observed land 
rent are from the same distribution, and that the shadow price of 
labor and observed off-farm wage are from the same distribution 
at 5% significance level. 
 
As we have noticed in section 3.2, we interpret the difference 
between the factor’s shadow price and market price as a 
measurement of factor market imperfection. The construction is 
simple. In each village in every year, we calculate the mean of the 
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shadow price of land and agricultural labor. The measurement of 
land rental market imperfection is the mean of the shadow price 
of land minus the mean of the market price at that year. The 
measurement of off-farm labor market imperfection is the mean of 
off-farm work wage minus the shadow price of agricultural labor. 
These two measures of market imperfection will be used in the 
following chapters. Note that in this study we use the 
measurement of market imperfection and transaction costs in the 
market interchangeably. 
Table 4.8 K-S test for shadow price of land and labor and 
their observed prices 
 
shadow price of 
land 
(Yuan/Year) 
observed land 
price 
(Yuan/Year) 
shadow price of 
labor 
(Yuan/Day) 
observed labor 
wage 
(Yuan/Day) 
mean 382.25 161.66 3.91 18.54 
std 263.51 152.15 5.36 11.77 
K-S 
test 
Hypothesis test 
result 
Asympotic p-
value ks2stat 
 
land 1 0.0000 0.65 
 
labor 1 0.0000 0.85 
  
Apparently, on the one hand, the difference between the shadow 
price of land and observed land rent is due to the transaction 
costs in the land rental market; on the other hand, the difference 
may be derived from the compensation for tenants for the risks of 
land loss in case of the landlord reclaiming the land. The 
difference between shadow price of labor and observed off-farm 
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wage may attribute to transaction costs in the off-farm labor 
market. The mean of observed off-farm wage is significantly 
higher than the shadow price of labor on farm. Therefore the 
landlord is likely to rent out land at a very low price because the 
opportunity cost for off-farm work is very low. The difference 
between the shadow price of factors and market prices may work 
as risk premium to let farmers involve in risky activities, for 
example rent land or doing off-farm work.  
 
In the case of an incomplete land rental market and a referring 
incomplete off-farm labor market, can land be transferred from 
low efficient farm households to more efficient farm households 
as we have suggested above? We are trying to answer it by 
looking at the result of the land rental market operation in rural 
Chongqing, i.e. by comparing the technical efficiency level 
between rented farm households, farm households that do not 
participate in land rental market and rented out farm households. 
ANOVA was used to measure the difference statistically. The 
results show that the differences at the mean of technical 
efficiency among different household types are significant at 5% 
level. The results are depicted in Figure 4.6. 
 
We can see from figure 4.6 that rented farm households are more 
likely to be more efficient than rented out farm households (note 
that rented out farm households have a lower technical efficiency 
score and rented farm households have a higher technical 
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efficiency score, not because they participate in the land rental 
market; participation in the land rental market and the individual 
technical efficiency level is insignificantly correlated, rendering the 
conclusion in the end of last section useful). This proves the 
existence of the horizontal effect: from the land rental market, 
land can be transferred from less efficient farm households to 
more efficient farm households. 
Figure 4.6ANOVA of technical efficiency level of different 
type of farm household 
 
But farm households who rent land are not notably more efficient 
than the other two groups, which may imply that in rural 
Chongqing the land rental market can improve land use efficiency 
by transferring land from less efficient farm households to more 
efficient farm households. But the potential of the land rental 
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market is not fully realized, because the most efficient farm 
households are more likely to stay in autarky due to land rental 
market imperfection. 
4.5.4 Alternative hypothesis 
Now we turn to test H2. The logic behind this hypothesis is that 
when farm households have different abilities to negotiate an off-
farm work wage, the more efficient farmer might be the one who 
is likely to get the higher wage than the less efficient farmer. A 
higher off-farm work wage attracts more efficient farmers who 
then leave the agricultural sector and transfer their land. Note that 
an important precondition for this hypothesis is that land property 
rights are secure. In the case of China, it may also require that 
land use rights are secure. As we have discussed previously in 
the section on land reform in China, farm households in today’s 
China enjoy a relatively secured land use right. Therefore, we 
assume that this precondition is met. 
Table 4.9 Technical efficiency level and participation in the 
land rental market 
(%) 
Less 
efficient 
Medium 
efficient 
More 
efficient 
Row 
sum 
Rent out 14.03  3.39  3.39  20.81  
Do not 
participate 
11.09  19.91  8.60  39.59  
Rent  8.14  9.95  21.49  39.59  
Column sum 33.26  33.26  33.48  100.00  
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Following the strategy we have developed in section 3.2, we have 
tabulated farm households’ technical efficiency level and their 
participation status in Table 4.9.  
 
For the more efficient group, farm households are more likely to 
rent land, but the possibility of renting out land is not close to zero. 
In this group, 10.1% ( 10.1% = 3.39 33.48⁄ × 100% ) farm 
households rent out land. Within this group, the KS test shows 
that the distribution of the technical efficiency level of rented out 
farm households is not significantly different from rented farm 
households, at 5% significance level; the difference between the 
technical efficiency level of rented farm households and non-
participating farm households and the difference between rented 
out farm households and non-participating farm households 
within this group are also insignificant. Results of the KS test 
imply that within the more efficient group, rented out farm 
households and rented farm households are indifferent in terms 
of their technical efficiency level. 
 
Therefore, more efficient farm households are more likely to rent 
land, but the possibility of renting out land is not totally ruled out. 
Thus, both H1 and H2 are plausible and not mutually exclusive. 
Apart from the technical efficiency level of farm households, there 
are other factors which affect the decision of farm households to 
participate in the land rental market. We are going to investigate 
the participation issues in chapter 5. We found that off-farm work 
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wage significantly affects participation decisions of farm 
households. If H1 and H2 are both true, it might be that even for 
the more efficient farm households the abilities to find off-farm 
work are different and so the payments from off-farm work are 
also different. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we distinguish two different effects of the land 
rental market on agricultural technical efficiency. One is the 
impact of the land rental market on land use efficiency in the 
market. That is the technical efficiency in the context of Pareto 
efficiency. Another is the impact of the land rental market on 
production technical efficiency of farm households. This is the 
technical efficiency in line with Farrell (1957). A competitive land 
rental market has the potential to improve these two kinds of 
technical efficiency. In the area of field research, however, the 
potential of the land rental market might be undermined by 
significant transaction costs, informational asymmetry, and 
opportunism of landlords in the market. But the land rental market 
still shows its capacity to improve agricultural production 
efficiency by using economies of scale and save the efficiency 
lose from labor migration. 
 
Based on our empirical research, the land rental market can 
transfer land from LFHs to MFHs because MFHs have a higher 
willingness to pay for additional units of land. Therefore, land use 
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efficiency can be improved by a competitive land rental market. 
Land rental participation can hardly affect technical efficiency of 
the production of farm households as we have measured. There 
are two possible explanations for this. One is that the land rental 
market cannot provide enough incentives for farmers to improve 
their management skills because of the imperfect market 
environment. Another explanation is that, as we have seen in the 
efficiency function, the major factors which affect the technical 
efficiency level of farms are individual effects. These factors are 
closely related to personal characters and are not likely to change 
quickly, which may explain the persistent technical efficiency 
domination in the overall technical efficiency level. Explanatory 
variables which can change in the short term may only affect 
time-varying technical efficiency, and contribute less to total 
technical efficiency change. 
 
It is possible that more efficient farm households rent out land for 
the sake of higher off-farm work wage. But more efficient farm 
households may already have a higher land and labor productivity, 
thus the possibility to find off-farm work which can offer 
sufficiently attractive payment to attract their labor is low. As a 
result, more efficient farm households are more likely to rent land 
instead of renting out land. 
 
To activate the potential of the land rental market, further reforms 
should aim at improving the market environment by reducing the 
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searching and information costs in order to make the market 
more competitive. Moreover, they should provide unemployment 
insurance and social security for migrated agricultural labor to 
curb the opportunism of “migrated landlords” and thus minimize 
uncertainties faced by tenants while producing incentives to work 
in agriculture. 
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Chapter 5 Land rental market and income inequality 
5.1 Introduction 
The land rental market was developed as an alternative to 
administrative reallocation of land in China in the late 1980s. The 
equity effect of the land rental market is quite controversial. 
Deininger and Jin (2005)state that the land rental market is 
superior to administrative reallocation due to its redistributive 
effect, while Kung (1994), Turner et al. (1998) as well as 
Benjamin and Brandt (1998) hold the opposite point of view. In 
this study we do not try to solve this debate, instead we only look 
at the equity effect of the land rental market in China, its rapid 
development in recent years rendering it the most significant way 
of reallocating land in rural areas. 
 
As we have analyzed in section 3.3, in order to measure the 
impact of participation in the land rental market on income 
distribution, we need to take correlations between income 
sources and land rental market imperfection into consideration. 
 
At this point, a few more remarks have to be made about the 
effect of land rental market imperfection: In a perfect land rental 
market, land rent equals marginal return of land, and income 
generated by land is distributed exactly according to the 
neoclassical theory of income distribution (supposing 
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homogenous land) (Kaldor, 1955). In this case, the land rental 
market has no effect on income distribution, only the initial 
distribution of land matters. While in developing countries like 
China, the land rental market cannot be treated as perfect 
because of informational asymmetry, transaction costs and, in 
some instances, administrative restrictions. This implies that the 
impact of the land rental market on income distribution will depart 
from the neutral status and create “winners” and “losers”. In this 
case, the land rental market affects income distribution. This 
effect depends on whether the land rental market will benefit the 
landlord or the tenant, as well as on the initial income distribution 
prior to participating in the land rental market.  
 
The structure of this chapter is organized as follows: in section 
5.2 we provide a descriptive analysis of income data used in this 
chapter. Section 5.3 elaborates research methods used in this 
study. Section 5.4 presents the result of the conducted empirical 
research. Section 5.5 summarizes and concludes this chapter. 
5.2 Descriptive analysis 
 
We present income of farm households and its components from 
2003 to 2010, with data from 2007 which is not included, in table 
5.1. Farm household income is classified into five income sources: 
land rental income, other agricultural income, income from labor 
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migration, local off-farm work income, and other income sources
22
.  
Share of land rental income in total income of farm households 
increased from 3.33% in 2003 to 10.52% in 2010. Income from 
labor migration contributes mostly to family income in rural 
Chongqing. Agricultural income (land rental income plus other 
agricultural income) still accounts for a significant share of total 
income of farm households. 
Table 5.1 Income of farm household and its components 
Income 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 
Mean income of farm 
household 
(2003 Constant Yuan) 
8432.191 11350.46 12997.98 13561.92 15884 12864.99 14854.65 
Std 5473.145 10242.7 13108.85 13647.49 14171.31 12346.5 11978.94 
Share of income source (%) 
     
Land rental income 3.33  4.23  4.08  5.01  5.49  8.95  10.52  
Other agricultural 
income 
18.74  19.14  16.98  16.47  15.28  23.44  22.32  
Income from labor 
migration 
36.77  27.20  43.89  35.37  35.50  33.24  37.06  
Local off-farm income 22.60  25.47  19.37  27.46  10.66  20.90  12.91  
Other income 18.54  23.96  15.67  15.70  33.08  13.48  17.18  
Nobs: 998 
      
Data source: Research Center of Rural Economy, and Chongqing Statistic Yearbook 2012. Income data are 
deflated to the price of 2003 by using the CPI. 
 
                                                             
22
For rented farm households, we first measure crop income by the profit of 
crop production without deduction of costs of rented land. Land rental 
income is derived from the share of rented land times agricultural income 
minus cost of rent, and the rest plus profit of livestock is defined as other 
agricultural income. For rented out farm households, land rental income is 
measured by the revenues from renting out land. Other agricultural income 
equals profit of cropping plus profits of livestock. Other income sources are 
defined identically across rented farm households. Rented out farm 
households and farm households do not participate in the land rental market 
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Land concentration is increasing as can be observed in figure 5.1.  
Figure 5.1 Land distribution before and after land rental 
transactions in 2003 and 2010 
 
 
 
We describe operational land distribution by using the Lorenz 
curve (this figure is different from Figure 4.3, not only as it shows 
land distribution changes before and after land rental transactions, 
but also land distribution over time). Land holding of farm 
households before land rental transactions were made is 
measured by the contracted land area. Land distributions in 2003 
and 2010, before land rental transaction, are almost the same 
(the Gini coefficients before land rental transactions are 0.30 and 
0.31 in 2003 and 2010 respectively). The slight gap might be due 
Data source: RCRE 
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to different observations which were used to plot in these two 
years. The land distribution following the land rental transactions 
from 2003 and 2010 shows great differences (Gini coefficients in 
2003 and 2010 after land rental transaction are 0.37 and 0.61 
respectively). We can confidently say that land distribution is 
much more unequal after land rental transactions, and the 
inequality of land distribution has increased significantly from 
2003 to 2010. 
 
Land concentration does not necessary mean income 
concentration. Because the effect of land rental transactions on 
income distribution depends not only on how land rental income 
is distributed among farm households and how land rental income 
correlates with other income sources, but also, as previously 
discussed, on land rental market conditions. Next we show the 
methods to investigate these two aspects. 
5.3 Research Strategy 
There are two ways to investigate the impact of the land rental 
market on income inequality: decomposition and regression. 
Decomposition of inequality measures can be conducted either 
by subgroups or by income components
23
. Presumably it is more 
convenient to decompose inequality measures by income 
components than by subgroups because land rental can be 
                                                             
23
For a formal definition of decomposability of inequality measures see 
Cowell (2011), pp.161-166. 
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considered straightforwardly as an income generating activity for 
both landlord and tenant. Suppose that total income of farm 
household 𝑖  is 𝑌𝑖(𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁)  consists of 𝐾  components 𝑌𝑖
𝑗(𝑗 =
1, … , 𝐾), one of which is income from land rental activity, so that 
𝑌𝑖 = ∑ 𝑌𝑖
𝑗𝐾
𝑗=1 . 
 
Shorrocks (1982) and Cowell (2011) show that the coefficient of 
variation, variances, the Herfindahl index as well as the square of 
coefficient of variation can be decomposed in the same manner. 
These are the variance based inequality measures. Contribution 
of income source 𝑗 to overall inequality in the decomposition of 
this family of inequality indexes can be consistently represented 
by the variances of income source 𝑗 (or ordinal transformation of 
variances) plus correlations between income source 𝑗 and other 
income sources (or corresponding ordinal transformation of this 
correlation). But decomposition of the variance family indexes are 
rarely used in empirical studies except for the square of the 
coefficient of variation, or Generalized Entropy (GE) index for 
which the weight parameter equals 2, which satisfies the income 
scale independence principle (Litchfield, 1999). GE index with 
𝛼 = 2 has the form 
 
 2
2
1
2
2
Y
GE
y


                                                                   (5.1) 
where 𝑌 = (𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑁) is distribution of farm household income, ?̅? 
denotes the mean income. Shorrocks (1982) has shown that, 
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𝜎2(𝑌) can be expressed as  
𝜎2(𝑌) = ∑ 𝜎2(𝑌𝑗)
𝐾
𝑗=1
+ ∑ ∑ 𝜌𝑗𝑚𝜎(𝑌
𝑗)𝜎(𝑌𝑚)
𝐾
𝑚=1
𝐾
𝑚≠𝑗
 
where 𝜌𝑗𝑚 isthe correlation coefficient between income source 𝑗 
and income source 𝑚. Substituting this result into the definition of 
𝐺𝐸(2), we get 
𝐺𝐸(2) =
1
2
∑ 𝜎2(𝑌𝑗)𝐾𝑗=1
?̅?2
+
1
2
1
?̅?2
∑ ∑ 𝜌𝑗𝑚𝜎(𝑌
𝑗)𝜎(𝑌𝑚)
𝐾
𝑚=1
𝐾
𝑚≠𝑗
 
 
That is the natural decomposition noticed by Cowell and Fiorio 
(2011). And a natural way to represent contribution of distribution 
of income source 𝑗 to total income inequality is given by  
       22
1
2
2
K
j j m
jmj
m j
GE Y Y Y
y
   


 
  
 
                    (5.2) 
and ∑ 𝐺𝐸(2)𝑗
𝐾
𝑗=1 = 𝐺𝐸(2).  
 
In this formulation we have 𝜌𝑗𝑚𝜎(𝑌
𝑗)𝜎(𝑌𝑚) to denote correlations 
between different income sources. From equation (5.2) we can 
get income inequality caused by land rental income and 
interactions of land rental income with other income components. 
With 𝐺𝐸(2)  measures on multiple periods, we can get an 
impression of how land rental income affects income inequality 
changes. 
 
The decomposition of Gini coefficient by income components is 
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used frequently in empirical research. Fei et al. (1978) and 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) provide two different ways for 
decomposition by income sources base on different expressions 
of the Gini index. These decompositions, however, do not show 
interactions of different income components. There are also other 
methods of decomposition of inequality measures between 
income components, for example the Shapley value based 
decomposition proposed by Chantreuil and Trannoy (2011), which 
also suffers from the same problem. 
 
It seems that if we employ different ways of decomposition we will 
get different measurements on the contribution of a particular 
income source to overall income inequality. Nevertheless if the 
inequality measure 𝐼(𝑌) satisfies the six assumptions stated by 
Shorrocks (1982) and is continuous, symmetric, and 𝐼(𝑌) = 0 if all 
individuals receive the same income, then the relative 
contribution of the income component 𝑗  to overall income 
inequality (or share of overall income inequality accounted by 
income component 𝑗) is given by  
   2cov , /jjs Y Y Y  
1
. . 1
K
j
j
s t s

  
which is indifference between inequality measures. We can show 
that 𝐺𝐸(2)𝑗 𝐺𝐸(2) = 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑌
𝑗 , 𝑌)/𝜎2(𝑌)⁄ . Therefore the 
decomposition of the 𝐺𝐸(2) index can produce consistent results. 
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Decomposition analysis can fulfill our interests on how distribution 
of income generated from land rental activities affects total 
income distribution, and how interactions of land rental income 
and off-farm income affects total income distribution. But in 
decomposition we cannot control other income sources and 
distributions of other income. And we cannot incorporate the land 
rental market imperfection. Therefore, we turn to regression 
analysis next. 
 
As discussed before, land rental market imperfection and off-farm 
labor market imperfection became evident by means of 
differences between marginal return of factors and market factor 
prices. Furthermore, we have constructed measures for imperfect 
market condition. An immediate way to investigate the impact of 
the incomplete land and labor market on income inequality is to 
do regression of the inequality indexes on measurements of land 
and labor market imperfection, together with other explanatory 
variables. 
 
Suppose that 𝐼(𝑌)𝑣,𝑡  is measured inequality index in group (or 
village) 𝑣 at time 𝑡. We run the regression as follows: 
𝐼(𝑌)𝑣,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑣 + 𝑋𝑣,𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑣,𝑡                                                          (5.3) 
where 𝛼𝑣 is group specific constant term, 𝛽 is the unknown slope 
parameter vector, and 𝜀𝑣,𝑡 is the error term. 𝑋𝑣,𝑡 is the explanatory 
variables vector which includes measures of land rental market 
imperfection and off-farm labor market imperfection (see section 
4.5.1). Furthermore, we include market participation rate as 
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explanatory variables. Those are proportions of farm households 
participating in the land rental market in village 𝑣 at time 𝑡, and 
proportions of labor participating in the off-farm labor market in 
village 𝑣 at time 𝑡. 
 
As the data used in this study is available at household level 
rather than individual level, the impact of family size or economies 
of scale of consumption should be accounted for. Family scale 
economies arise when some family consumption can be shared 
among family members, making larger households achieve 
certain levels of welfare at lower per capita expenditure (Logan, 
2011). This may render direct comparisons between income data 
from households with different sizes misleading. Thus, in income 
inequality measurement it is necessary to adjust household 
income according to family size. Rather than calculating the 
equivalence scale for each family member as in Pollak and Wales 
(1979), in this study we use the method suggested by Yin and 
Wan (2006). Supposed that family size is denoted by 𝑛, then the 
normalized family size is given by 𝑛𝛿 , and adjusted household 
income per capita is 𝑌𝑖
∗ = 𝑌𝑖 𝑛
𝛿⁄ , where 𝛿 ∈ [0,1]. If 𝛿 = 0, then 
there are complete economies of scale in consumption which 
means everything can be shared within the family without losing 
utilities. 𝛿 = 1  means there is no economy of scale in 
consumption. In this study, we take δ  as 0, 0.5, 0.8, and 1 
respectively to reveal effects of economies of scale in 
consumption on inequality measurement. In the following analysis 
 110 
 
we include Gini coefficient as reference.  
5.4 Empirical results 
5.4.1 Measurement and decomposition of income inequality 
First we show effects of household scale economies on the 
measurement of the income inequality index. Before we interpret 
these results, we should note that generalized entropy index with 
𝛼 = 2 is more sensitive to changes in higher incomes, while the 
Gini index puts more weight on income changes near the mean 
income. 
 
With 𝛿 = 0  which means household income data were used 
directly in measurement of income inequality without account for 
differences in family size, both 𝐺𝐸(2) the index and the Gini 
coefficient indicate a trend of income inequality change that 
increases first and then decreases as shown in figure 5.2. The 
measured inequality index reaches its peak in 2006. The effects 
of family economies of scale are obvious in this figure. Generally 
speaking, income inequality index which treats households as 
individuals tend to overestimate the real inequality level, except 
for the year 2010 with the 𝐺𝐸(2) index. This appears more 
systematically with the Gini index as it is shown in the right figure 
in figure 5.2. 
 
Correlations coefficients between land rental income and other 
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income sources are presented in table 5.2. A negative value of 
the correlation coefficient implies that land rental income can 
reduce income inequality caused by local off-farm income and 
income from labor migration, and vice versa (see equation (5.2)), 
even though the correlation between land rental income and local 
off-farm income is weak given the small absolute value of 
correlation coefficients. As we shall see, however, land rental 
income is positively correlated with other agricultural income and 
income from other sources, which means income generated by 
land rental activities may enhance the contributions of other 
agricultural income and other income to income inequality, and 
vise verse.  
Figure 5.2 Estimated 𝐆𝐄(𝟐) and Gini index from 2003 to 2010 
with different economy of scale 
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Table 5.2 Mean correlation coefficients of land rental income 
and other income components 
 
Land rental income 
 𝛿 = 0 𝛿 = 0.5 𝛿 = 0.8 𝛿 = 1 
Other agricultural income 0.378  0.325  0.291  0.271  
Income from labor migration -0.145  -0.163  -0.167  -0.166  
Local off-farm income -0.035  -0.033  -0.027  -0.021  
Other income 0.142  0.125  0.118  0.116  
 
The overall contribution of land rental income to income inequality 
was increasing from 2003 to 2010 at different levels of economies 
of scale in consumption as it is shown in table 5.3. With an 
increase of 𝛿 or decrease of economies of scale in consumption, 
this contribution becomes smaller, expect for the year 2010. That 
means after accounting for family size, land rental income is 
distributed more equally. This is consistent with the findings that 
larger households are more likely to rent land (see Appendix 
Table 1). 
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Table 5.3 Absolute and relative contributions of land rental 
income to income inequality 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 2009 2010 
Inequality 
caused by land 
rental income 
       
𝛿 = 0  0.004  0.003  0.010  0.005  0.013  0.031  0.074  
𝛿 = 0.5  0.003  0.002  0.006  0.003  0.008  0.017  0.106  
𝛿 = 0.8  0.003  0.002  0.004  0.002  0.006  0.011  0.138  
𝛿 = 1  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.001  0.004  0.009  0.163  
Relative contribution 
     
𝛿 = 0  0.017  0.007  0.021  0.011  0.032  0.066  0.228  
𝛿 = 0.5  0.013  0.006  0.014  0.006  0.023  0.049  0.255  
𝛿 = 0.8  0.012  0.006  0.010  0.004  0.018  0.034  0.263  
𝛿 = 1  0.011  0.007  0.008  0.003  0.015  0.024  0.265  
 
5.4.2 Results of regression 
We construct a small panel data for estimation. We calculate 
income inequality indexes for each village in every year. Finally 
we get 21 observations for each 𝛿  value for 𝐺𝐸(2)  and Gini 
indexes respectively. We use a fixed effect model in this 
estimation (for we assume that some time invariant village 
characteristics may correlate with land and labor market 
imperfection). Results are shown in Table 5.4.  
 
Note that there is no village effect reported in Table 5.4. A dummy 
variable can be used to get the village effect, but it will reduce two 
degrees of freedom. Considering the small sample size, we prefer 
to save two degrees of freedom and neglect village effects. 
  
Table 5.4 Estimated models for determines of income inequality 
 
𝐺𝐸(2) Gini index 
Parameters  𝛿 = 0 𝛿 = 0.5 𝛿 = 0.8 𝛿 = 1 𝛿 = 0 𝛿 = 0.5 𝛿 = 0.8 𝛿 = 1 
Constant 
0.440 ** 0.606 ** 0.795 ** 0.969 ** 0.417 *** 0.446 *** 0.470 *** 0.494 *** 
(5.42) (5.36) (4.77) (4.45) (106.25) (24.91) (20.02) (21.02) 
Proportion of participation 
in the land rental market 
-0.076 -0.131 -0.186 -0.231*
 
-0.003 -0.022 -0.035 -0.037 
(0.43) (1.07) (2.15) (3.65) (0.03) (0.21) (0.30) (0.33) 
Proportion of participation 
in labor migration 
-0.155 -0.326 -0.513
* 
-0.680** -0.024 -0.042 ** -0.060 -0.067 
(0.45) (1.25) (2.92) (5.91) (0.99) (5.74) (2.30) (1.69) 
Land rental market 
imperfection 
0.019 0.044 0.073 0.099 -0.007 -0.019 -0.024 -0.026 
(0.48) (0.65) (0.86) (1.03) (-0.35) (-0.67) (-0.730) (-0.71) 
Off-farm labor market 
imperfection 
-0.311
* 
-0.716** -1.121** -1.473
* 
-0.104** -0.167*** -0.207*** -0.235*** 
(-4.15) (-5.09) (-4.29) (-4.14) (-4.39) (-28.31) (-22.56) (-27.62) 
R
2 
0.000 0.190 0.504 0.660 0.003 0.048 0.156 0.248 
Note: 
*
Statistically significant at the 10%-level. **Statistically significant at the 5%-level. ***Statistically 
significant at the 1%-level. Values in parentheses are t-value.  
  
The first impression of these results is that fitness of the model 
can be largely improved with decrease of family economies of 
scale. Therefore, if income data is only available at household 
level, it is necessary to adjust income by family size in inequality 
analysis. 
 
Then we find that the 𝐺𝐸(2) index regression model can generally 
produce a higher fitness than the Gini index model. Not only 𝑅2 is 
higher when 𝐺𝐸(2) was used, but also we note that the value𝑡 of 
the coefficients of participation in land and off-farm labor market is 
higher when 𝐺𝐸(2)  was used. Some of the coefficients (when 
𝐺𝐸(2) is used and 𝛿 = 0.8) are insignificant because our sample 
size is relatively small. So with a large data set, we can get more 
favorable results. The reason seems to be that the 𝐺𝐸(2) index 
ranges from 0 to positive infinite, while the Gini index would 
confine itself within the interval of [0,1] . Hence, a linear 
regression may favor 𝐺𝐸(2)  index. So the following inferences 
are based on the results of 𝐺𝐸(2) index regression.  
 
We can see that only the coefficient of off-farm labor market 
imperfection is consistently significant with alternative 𝛿 values. A 
negative value of this coefficient means that an increase in the 
gap between off-farm wage and shadow price of agricultural labor 
will reduce income inequality. A possible explanation is that farm 
households with migrated labor are initially poor before their labor 
left the agriculture sector (Du et al., 2006). A higher off-farm wage 
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can raise their labor income and narrow the income distance with 
other farm households. 
 
The impact of the land rental market imperfection on income 
inequality is insignificant, and the magnitude of the coefficient of 
land rental market imperfection is only marginal compared to the 
coefficients of off-farm labor market imperfection. Despite the 
obvious imperfection in the land rental market, it has insignificant 
impact on the income distribution, probably due to land rental 
income only accounts for a small share of total income. 
 
Participation in the land rental market has significant impact on 
income inequality in the case of 𝛿 = 1. A negative value of this 
coefficient implies that participation in the land rental market may 
reduce income inequality. We would like to combine the 
explanation with land rental market imperfection. Given the land 
rental market imperfection, the more households participate in the 
land rental market, the more income is transferred from landlord 
to tenant. This may reduce the inequality of income distribution. 
Participation in labor migration also leads to an increase in the 
inequality index. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusion 
From the decomposition of the income inequality index by its 
components, we found that the contribution of land rental income 
to total income distribution is increasing over the observation 
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period. By the results of regression, we found that participation in 
the land rental market may lead to an increase in income 
inequality, because the incomplete land rental market will create 
“winners” and “losers” through the income transfer effect. 
 
As income from the non-agriculture sector becomes increasingly 
important, the land rental market may be used as a tool to reduce 
income inequality caused by labor migration and off-farm work, 
provided that we can remedy land rental market failures. 
 
Empirically we found that in regression analysis of income 
inequality, 𝐺𝐸(2)  index could be preferable in terms of model 
fitness compared to the Gini index, given that𝐺𝐸(2) provides a far 
more wide range to fit than the Gini index. Other inequality 
indexes in a generalized entropy family could also possess the 
same property. 
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Chapter 6  Land rental market imperfection and 
participation 
6.1 Introduction 
China is in the process of transition from a centrally planned 
economy to a market economy. Developing a functioning land 
rental market is a crucial aspect of this transition process as it 
changes the land distribution from administrative reallocation to 
market based mechanisms. As we examined in the last two 
chapters, participation in the land rental market can significantly 
improve land use efficiency and production efficiency of farm 
households. But inadequate competition in the land rental market 
and off-farm labor market failure prohibited the potential of the 
land rental market and exacerbated income inequality in rural 
Chongqing. 
 
Our desire is to fully explore the potential of the land rental 
market in promoting rural economic development. So it is 
necessary to investigate what factors determine farm household 
participation in the land rental market. On the one hand, some of 
the farm households who have higher efficiency levels are 
detached from the land rental market. Identifying the reasons for 
not participating in the land rental market is a major concern for 
policy-makers. On the other hand, we consider the imperfect land 
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rental market and the off-farm labor market as possible reasons 
why some of the most efficient farm households are staying out of 
the land rental market. It is needed to test this hypothesis 
empirically.  
 
We have elaborated the theoretical framework in section 3.4. In 
the following, we describe the explanatory variable in more detail 
and the data used in this analysis in section 6.2. Section 6.3 
presents estimation strategies and results which are followed by 
discussions and conclusions in section 6.4. 
6.2 Variable explanations and data descriptions 
6.2.1 Variable explanations 
For the sake of presentation, we reproduce the reduced form of 
the land rental supply and demand function in section 3.4.  
* * , , , , , , ,I I yR R P r C M T Vw D
 
  
 
                                              (6.1) 
and  
* * , , , , , , ,O O yR R P r C M T Vw D
 
  
 
                                            (6.2) 
 
Consider the first order Taylor series expansion for renting in 
equation (6.1): 
𝑅𝑖,𝐼 = 𝛽0 + (
𝜕𝑅𝑖,𝐼
𝜕𝑃𝑦
) 𝑃𝑦 + (
𝜕𝑅𝑖,𝐼
𝜕𝑟
) 𝑟 + (
𝜕𝑅𝑖,𝐼
𝜕𝐶
) 𝐶 + ∑ (
𝜕𝑅𝑖,𝐼
𝜕𝑋𝑖,𝑗
) 𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖  (6.3) 
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where 𝑋 = [𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝐽]  denotes explanatory variables other than 
output price, land rent, and transaction costs. Denote 𝛽1 =
𝜕𝑅𝑖,𝐼 𝜕𝑃𝑦⁄ , 𝛽2 = 𝜕𝑅𝑖,𝐼 𝜕𝑟⁄ , 𝛽3 = 𝜕𝑅𝑖,𝐼 𝜕𝐶⁄ , and 𝛽𝑗 = 𝜕𝑅𝑖,𝐼 𝜕𝑋𝑖,𝑗⁄ , it 
follows that equation (6.3) can be expressed as 
𝑅𝑖,𝐼 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑟 + 𝛽3𝐶 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖                          (6.4) 
 
Following the same manner, we can develop an estimable linear 
renting out equation from (6.2). 
 
Among the independent variables, 
yP  is measured with the 
agricultural output price index by using data from the Chongqing 
Statistical Year Book, r  is measured by the average of land rent 
in all three villages in each year, while transaction costs in the 
land rental market are the same as the ones we used before. 
Additionally, we add transaction costs in the off -farm labor market 
as an explanatory variable. In terms of land endowment, we use 
land area per family labor. We do not directly use the monetary 
value of intermediate input as an explanatory variable in the 
estimation function because a decision on intermediate input is 
likely to be made following the land rental transaction. Instead we 
use family wealth as a proxy for intermediate input since rich 
families are likely to spend more on intermediate input than poor 
families. We use non-agricultural assets as a measurement of 
family wealth. Capital stock of agricultural production is measured 
in the same way as we did in the production function analysis. 
Regarding family labor endowment, we group family labor into 
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three groups: age between 17-34, age between 35-54 and age 
between 55-65. The number of laborers in each group is used as 
explanatory variables. 
 
We also include experiences and education in regression, 
because experiences and education affect the quality of labor and 
then impact the marginal product of land, which in turn affects the 
land rental decisions of farm households. In this study we use the 
age of household heads and years of schooling as a proxy for 
experience and education.  
 
In the estimation we use the multinominal Logit model to study 
the “if or not” decision (the options are renting land, renting out 
land, or refraining from participating in the land rental market), 
and the Tobit model to analyze the second “how much” decision 
(how much land is rented or rented out). Testing if land rental 
market imperfection and off-farm labor market imperfection have 
an impact on the land rental decision of farm households can be 
conducted by post-estimation tests if the corresponding 
coefficients are zero. 
6.2.2 Data descriptions 
In the research area 60.4% of farm households participate in 
the land rental market either by renting or renting out land (see 
table 6.1). The participation rate, however, differs among villages. 
In village 1 the participation rate is the lowest (48%) and rented 
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land area per farm household is lower than the average rented 
out land area. Village 2 has the highest participation rate and the 
same participation pattern as village 1. In village 3, the 
participation rate is relatively high, and the average farm 
household is renting more land than it is renting out. 
Table 6.1 Summary of land rental market participation 
 Overall Xiehe Changshui Tianba 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Share of households 
participate in land 
rental market (%) 
60.40 48.00 68.62 64.41 
Rented land area per 
household (mu) 
0.98 2.40 0.16 0.86 0.46 2.17 2.45 3.06 
Rented out land area 
per household (mu) 
0.50 0.93 0.59 0.94 0.79 1.12 0.08 0.39 
Average operational 
farm size (mu) 
3.61 3.49 1.38 1.41 2.80 2.67 7.02 3.36 
Land endowment per 
households (mu) 
3.30 1.84 1.78 0.93 3.08 1.15 4.54 1.88 
Data source: RCRE 
 
Participation status of farm households in the land rental market 
is fairly persistent as we can observe in table 6.2. 72.57% of the 
observed non-participants do not participate for two periods in a 
row. For farm households who rented land for one period, 75.49% 
remained renting land for the next period. And for farm 
households who rented out land for one period, 75.53% remained 
renting out land for the next period. 
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Table 6.2 Transition probabilities of land rental market participation 
 
Non-participants Rent in Rent out Total 
Non-participants 208(72.47) 31(10.8) 48(16.72) 287(100) 
Rent 33(16.18) 154(75.49) 17(8.33) 204(100) 
Rent out 28(14.89) 18(9.57) 142(75.53) 188(100) 
Total 269(39.62) 203(29.9) 207(30.49) 679(100) 
Note: figures in parentheses refer to percentage. Data source: RCRE 
We describe variables that will be used to study farm 
household decisions of participation in the land rental market in 
table 6.3. These variables include household factor endowments, 
household characteristics, and conditions of the land rental 
market and off-farm labor market. On average, a household has 
3.8 members. The average family size differs among the villages. 
The village Tianba has the largest family size. On average one 
farm household has 4.6 members. This number is 3.6 and 3.1 in 
Changshui and Xiehe respectively. Household head age in the 
village Xiehe is higher than in the other two villages, but the 
household head educational level is the lowest in Xiehe on 
average.  
 
Agricultural assets are measured by the sum of the monetary 
value of agricultural tools, equipment and facilities. We do not 
have direct measures for non-agricultural assets of farm 
households. Instead, we use annual consumption as a proxy for 
non-agricultural assets of farm households. All monetary values 
are converted to 2004 prices by using the price index for 
agricultural production and the consumer price index respectively. 
  
Table 6.3 Description of Farm Households and Village Characteristics 
 
 
Overall Xiehe Changshui Tianba 
 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
HH population 17-34 years 0.86  0.92  0.72 0.82 0.81 0.87 1.08 1.02 
HH population 35-54 1.09  0.91  0.98 0.89 0.91 0.94 1.39 0.84 
HH population 55-65 0.53  0.76  0.52 0.75 0.56 0.81 0.5 0.72 
family size 3.76  1.41  3.13 1.18 3.62 1.3 4.64 1.31 
Age of HH head 49.88  16.91  53.57 12.9 49.64 23.34 46 10.51 
Year of schooling of HH head 6.19  2.43  5.27 2.74 6.5 2.14 6.89 2 
Agricultural assets (Yuan) 1676.61  1927.26  502.4 901.22 2630.72 2353.35 1960.7 1545.86 
Non-agricultural assets (Yuan) 8832.81  11674.96  6996.95 4455.66 5296.83 3663.62 14758.35 18708.15 
Land labor ratio (mu/labor) 1.30  0.84  0.82 0.49 1.43 0.74 1.7 0.99 
Share of migrated labor (%) 31.90 47.91 24.11 23.68 
Off farm wage (Yuan) 21.86  6.37  16.66 3.66 26.34 5.23 22.58 6.34 
Div_land (Yuan) 224.59  92.66  188.66 75.63 209.05 83.2 276.06 107.4 
Div_labor (Yuan) 13.63  3.45  13.39 2.14 16.12 0.35 11.37 4.7 
Data source: RCRE 
 
  
The land labor ratio is measured by land endowment divided by 
the number of laborers on farm households. On average, each 
laborer owns 1.3 mu land in the research area. Land endowment 
is relatively strong in the village Tianba with each laborer owning 
1.7 mu of land. The village Xiehe has the lowest land labor ratio 
with 0.82. 
 
On average 31.9% of laborers are employed in the off-farm sector. 
The village Xiehe has the highest off-farm labor market 
participation (47.91%), followed by Changshui (24.11%) and 
Tianba (23.68%). On average, an off-farm worker earns 21.86 
Yuan per labor-day. Return to off-farm labor differs among the 
villages. Off-farm laborers earn 16.66, 26.34, and 22.58Yuan per 
day in Xiehe, Changshui, and Tianba respectively. Div_land and 
Div_labor denote transaction costs in the land rental market and 
off-farm labor market respectively. 
6.3 Empirical results 
First we show the results of the analysis of factors which 
determine whether farm households will participate in the land 
rental market. As we have used a panel data set, the problem of 
data attrition is examined first. Following Greene (2012), we use 
the entire sample of data to estimate a pooled multinomial Logit 
model. We add 𝑊𝐴𝑉𝐸 to the pooled model, where 𝑊𝐴𝑉𝐸 is the 
number of waves at which the individual is present. Significant 
coefficient of 𝑊𝐴𝑉𝐸  means the null hypothesis of missing at 
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random can be rejected. Regression results are listed in table 6.4. 
The results show that at least for renting land decisions, data 
attrition is a problem. Then we use impute probability weight to 
correct the data attrition problem. 
Table 6.4 Results of pooled multinomial Logit model 
 
   Rent in        Rent out 
Variables Coef. Std. Coef. Std. 
HH population 17-34 years -0.520***  0.126  -0.189  0.127  
HH population 35-54 -0.124  0.169  -0.077  0.144  
HH population 55-65 0.170  0.182  -0.167  0.151  
Age of HH’s head -0.008  0.010  0.000  0.006  
Year of schooling of HH’s head -0.013  0.046  0.057  0.039  
Land labor ratio -1.071***  0.172  -0.018  0.131  
Output price index -0.021*  0.010  0.031***  0.010  
Agricultural assets (Yuan) 0.321***  0.054  -0.094***  0.036  
Non-agricultural assets (Yuan) 0.889***  0.179  0.089  0.143  
Land rent -0.004*  0.002  0.006***  0.002  
Off-farm wage (Yuan) 0.017  0.021  0.027  0.025  
Div_land (Yuan) -0.003**  0.001  -0.002  0.001  
Div_labor (Yuan) -0.152***  0.043  0.341***  0.067  
Share of migrated labor (%) -7.590***  1.354  2.991**  1.337  
Wave -0.176**  0.081  -0.081  0.101  
_cons 1.063  2.197  -11.212***  2.072  
Pseudo R2=0.231 
Log likelihood = -717.955  LR chi2(30) = 430.03 
Note: *Statistically significant at the 10%-level. **Statistically significant at the 5%-
level. ***Statistically significant at the 1%-level. 
 
After inverse probability weights were imputed, we use a mixed 
effects multinomial logistic model to study choices of farm 
households. The Hausman test for the random effect model 
versus fixed effect model is replaced by a more general latent 
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response model 
* '
is s i i isy x                                                                        (6.5) 
where 𝜂𝑖 is latent variables, 𝑠 = 1,2, … , 𝑆 is unordered categories. 
Response 𝑠 is chosen  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖𝑠 
if 𝑦𝑖𝑠
∗ > 𝑦𝑖𝑘
∗ , ∀𝑘, 𝑘 ≠ 𝑠. 𝜂𝑖 represents individual heterogeneities and 
may correlate with 𝐱𝑖. Mundlak’s (1978) approach uses the mean 
of 𝐱𝑖toaccount for the correlation between 𝐱𝑖and 𝜂𝑖 (note that the 
mean of time-varying variables is included). Let ?̅?𝑖 denote the 
mean of time varying covariates. We can specify the latent 
variables as 
'
ii ix   

                                                         (6.6) 
 
One way to estimate model (6.5) and (6.6) is to substitute (6.6) 
with (6.5) and use the multinomial Logit model for the estimation 
only with one latent variable 𝜉𝑖which is orthogonal to 𝐱. Simulated 
maximum likelihood estimation can be employed to estimate this 
model as in Carter and Yao (2002). Another approach would be to 
treat functions in (6.6) as structural equations, combined with 
(6.5), and the overall model can be estimated by methods used in 
the structural equations model, which usually is a maximum 
likelihood estimation (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004). There is no 
theoretical criterion to discriminate against one approach to the 
advantage of the other. But from a practical point of view, the 
latter is preferred because there are well-established commands 
in Stata to perform a structural equations model. In Stata we can 
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estimate the structural equations model by using gllamm 
command which is a user developed program (gllamm stands for 
Generalized Linear Latent And Mixed Models), or by using gsem 
command which is a new feature of Stata 13 (gsem stands for 
Generalized Structural Equations Model). 
 
Nonzero of 𝜸 indicates evidence against the random effect model. 
The test statistics is 𝐻′ = ?̂?′[𝐸𝑠𝑡. 𝐴𝑠𝑦. 𝑉𝑎𝑟(?̂?)]−1?̂? which has a chi 
square distribution. First we test the assumption of the random 
effect model. The value of 𝐻′ is 29.1088, which is larger than the 
critical value of chi squared distribution at 5% level of significance 
with eleven degrees of freedom, 21.026. Therefore, the random 
effect model assumption is rejected. Results of the multinomial 
Logit model were presented in table 6.5. Farm households do not 
participate in the land rental market and are chosen as base 
outcome.  
 
The estimated variance of the random effect is 3.06, which 
means the standard deviation is 1.75. Thus a 1 standard 
deviation change in the random effect amounts to a 
 exp 1.75 5.75 change in the relative risk ratio.  
 
In terms of the demographic structure, farm households with 
more members in the age group between 17-34 and with a well-
educated household head are more likely to stay away from the 
land rental market than to rent land.  
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As expected, the land labor ratio has significant impact on rental 
decisions of farm households. Farm households which have a 
higher land labor ratio are more likely to stay away from the land 
rental market than to rent land. It therefore seems unlikely that 
land is transferred to land-rich farm households in the land rental 
market. This means there is only a low probability that the market 
mechanism of land reallocation leads to a concentration of land. 
The coefficient of the land labor ratio in the rent out equation, 
however, is insignificant. 
 
Farm households with more agricultural assets and non-
agricultural assets are more likely to rent land than to not 
participate in the land rental market. The coefficient of land rent is 
significant in the renting out equation and is positive. These 
results are in line with our expectations. 
 
At this point it should be noted that significance and magnitude of 
coefficients in the renting equation and renting out equation are 
asymmetric. Especially the coefficients of the household 
population between 17-34 years, years of schooling of household 
head, land labor ratio, agricultural assets, non-agricultural assets, 
and land rent. One possible explanation is that these variables 
differ greatly between rented farm households and farm 
households that do not participate, but differ less between rented 
out farm households and farm households that do not participate.  
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Table 6.5 Estimated Multinomial Logit model 
 
Rent in Rent out 
Variables 
Coefficien
ts 
Std 
Coefficien
ts 
Std 
HH population 17-34 years -0.550** 0.236  -0.223  0.230  
HH population 35-54 -0.115  0.290  -0.025  0.275  
HH population 55-65 0.150  0.309  -0.043  0.294  
Age of HH’s head 0.015  0.017  0.017  0.016  
Year of schooling of HH’s head -0.122* 0.067  -0.059  0.061  
Land labor ratio -1.300*** 0.269  -0.139  0.231  
Output price index -0.030** 0.013  0.021  0.013  
Log of Agricultural assets 
(Yuan) 
0.353*** 0.079  -0.058  0.066  
Log of Non-agricultural assets 
(Yuan) 
0.760*** 0.253  -0.058  0.211  
Land rent 0.000  0.003  0.008*** 0.003  
Off-farm wage (Yuan/Day) -0.024  0.027  -0.010  0.031  
Div_land (Yuan) 0.000  0.002  0.000  0.002  
Div_labor (Yuan) -0.168*** 0.058  0.347*** 0.086  
Share of migrated labor (%) -1.324  2.136  9.654*** 2.128  
Cons 12.150  
10.87
4  
0.552  
10.86
0  
Group means    Coefficients Std 
Variance of random effect 3.060 0.759 
HH population 17-34 years -0.153 0.328 
HH population 35-54 0.005 0.428 
HH population 55-65 0.186 0.470 
Age of HH’s head -0.031 0.023 
Output price index -0.110 0.074 
Agricultural assets (Yuan) -0.141 0.116 
Non-agricultural assets (Yuan) 0.620 0.497 
Land rent (Yuan) -0.035** 0.025 
Off-farm wage (Yuan) 0.715 0.300 
Div_land (Yuan) -0.016 0.010 
Div_labor (Yuan) -0.660 0.330 
Share of migrated labor (%) 5.837 8.955  
Note: *Statistically significant at the 10%-level. **Statistically significant at 
the-5% level. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Output price changes only affect renting decisions significantly, 
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which may imply that farm households who rent land are more 
sensitive to changes of the output price, given that many farm 
households rent out land at zero explicit costs. 
 
The off-farm labor market has an important effect on farm 
household participation in the land rental market. Note that off-
farm work wage has no significant impact on renting decisions, 
but div_labor, the difference between off farm work wage and 
shadow price of labor, does affect renting and renting out land. If 
the marginal product of agricultural labor is kept constant, rising 
off-farm work wages make farm households more likely to rent 
out land instead of renting land.  
 
We use the share of migrated laborers in the village as an 
indicator of farm household decisions of participation in the off-
farm labor market. It has a significant effect on farm households’ 
decisions to rent out land: the more likely farm households 
participate in off-farm labor market, the more likely they rent out 
land.  
 
In the following, we present the results of the Tobit model. We 
estimate the land area that is rented and the land area that is 
rented out separately. The “rent” estimation used the whole 
sample with positive values for the rented land area and zero 
otherwise. The “rent out” estimation set the land area rented out 
as positive and zero for other observations.  
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Table 6.6 Estimation of the Tobit model 
 
       Rent       Rent out 
 
Coefficient Std Coefficient Std 
HH population 17-34 years -0.617  0.402  -0.079  0.129  
HH population 35-54 -0.203  0.490  -0.120  0.149  
HH population 55-65 -0.215  0.521  -0.161  0.186  
Age of HH’s head 0.009  0.036  0.003  0.003  
Years of schooling of HH’s head 0.025  0.118  -0.050  0.033  
Land labor ratio -1.691*** 0.427  0.213  0.151  
Output price index 0.004  0.020  -0.009** 0.004  
Log of Agricultural assets (Yuan) 0.553*** 0.153  -0.063* 0.034  
Log of Non-agricultural assets (Yuan) 1.500*** 0.407  -0.221** 0.104  
Land rent (Yuan) -0.006  0.005  0.015*** 0.002  
Off-farm wage (Yuan/Day) 0.008  0.044  -0.002  0.016  
Div_land (Yuan) -0.005  0.003  0.003*** 0.001  
Div_labor (Yuan) -0.108  0.075  0.099** 0.049  
Share of migrated labor (%) -6.325  4.495  7.139*** 1.068  
Group means 
 
 
 
 HH population 17-34 years -0.182  0.555  0.081  0.262  
HH population 35-54 0.400  0.767  -0.018  0.297  
HH population 55-65 0.438  0.838  0.263  0.323  
Age of HH’s head -0.010  0.043  -0.008  0.015  
Output price index -0.164* 0.085  0.003  0.096  
Agricultural assets (Yuan) -0.007  0.242  -0.124* 0.074  
Non-agricultural assets (Yuan) -0.901  0.831  1.390*** 0.367  
Land rent (Yuan) 0.050  0.039  -0.068*** 0.024  
Off farm wage (Yuan) 0.085  0.273  0.674* 0.354  
Div_land (Yuan) 0.019  0.019  -0.017** 0.007  
Div_labor (Yuan) -0.352  0.382  -0.164  0.334  
Share of migrated labor (%) -5.791  9.195  12.140  10.911  
Constant 11.789  18.012  -17.553  8.690  
/sigma_u 2.661*** 0.297  1.268*** 0.126  
/sigma_e 3.111*** 0.159  1.024*** 0.055  
Rho 0.422  0.060  0.605  0.053  
Note: *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
 ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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We use the Tobit estimator in this estimation. Results of the Tobit 
estimation were presented in table 6.6. 
 
Results show that participation in the off-farm labor market tends 
to increase the prediction for the rented out land area. div_labor 
only affects the predicted rented out land area significantly. The 
leveling effect of the land rental market on operational farm size 
among farm households in renting can easily be observed with 
the help of the Tobit model. For an increase of one unit in the land 
labor ratio, there is a 1.69 mu decrease in the predicted value of 
land rent in the area. 
 
Both agricultural and non-agricultural asset possession have 
positive contributions on the predicted value of land rent in the 
area. For the rented out land area, farm households with more 
agricultural assets and non-agricultural assets tend to rent less 
land out. 
 
Div_land has a significantly positive effect on rented out land area, 
while the long-term effects of land rental market imperfection on 
renting out land area are negative and the magnitude is larger 
(see the coefficient of div_land in the group mean in the renting 
out equation). A mix of these two effects might show that div_land 
negatively affects the land rent out area. 
 
We further conduct a simulation analysis about how changes in 
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the output price and participation in the off-farm labor market 
affect the participation in the land rental market in a partial 
equilibrium framework in a closed economy (no international 
capital flows to the land rental market in China). By using data 
from the China Rural Fixed Observation Point: Survey Summary, 
we find that the calibrated average annual growth rate of rural 
labor migration from 2000 to 2009 was 1.06%. The agricultural 
output price index is estimated to grow annually at 6.1% from 
2000 to 2011 by using data from the China Statistic Yearbook.  
Table 6.7 Simulation of the effects of changes of labor migration 
and of the output price for land rental market participation 
Simulation results t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 
Probability of renting 0.284  0.222  0.166  0.119  0.081  0.052  
Probability of renting out 0.282  0.345  0.414  0.486  0.560  0.632  
Probability of not participating 0.434  0.433  0.420  0.395  0.359  0.316  
Predicted rent area (mu) 1.931  1.922  1.914  1.906  1.899  1.892  
Predicted rent out area (mu) 0.624  0.624  0.624  0.623  0.620  0.616  
       Simulated demand and supply by representative farm household (probability of rent or rent out 
times predicted rent or rent out area) 
Demand (mu) 0.548  0.427  0.318  0.226  0.153  0.099  
Supply (mu) 0.176  0.215  0.258  0.303  0.347  0.389  
       Land rental market 
equilibrium       
Demand=Supply (mu) 0.224  0.221  0.213  0.200  0.179  0.153  
Equilibrium land rent (Yuan) 485.992  400.731  311.153  218.375  122.075  21.992  
 
The simulation results for changes of the agricultural output price 
and participation in the off-farm labor market are reported in table 
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6.7. The predicted participation rate from the multinomial Logit 
model shows that the probability of farm household participation 
in the land rental market has increased with changes of output 
prices and perception of labor migration. In terms of participation 
in the land rental market, farm households are far more likely to 
rent out land than rent land. Combined with the results of the 
Tobit model simulation, we predict that there will be more land 
rented out than rented if other factors are not changed. That 
means that the land rental market supply will exceed demand and 
equilibrium land rent would be very low as it is shown in the 
bottom of table 6.7. 
 
This context implies low land use efficiency. To improve land use 
efficiency, it is necessary to introduce “outsiders” to the local land 
rental market, as we have seen that the land rental market is 
constrained within the village. Outsiders like farmers from other 
villages and agricultural enterprises may generate sufficient 
demand for the local land rental market and promote land rental 
market development and land use efficiency. Indeed, there were 
agricultural enterprises involved in large scale land transfer in 
Chongqing for the production of Chinese red pepper, oranges, 
and lotus root. And the rent paid by agricultural enterprises is 
more likely higher than the rent paid by farmer (Zhang, 2010).  
6.4 Concluding remarks 
We found that variables like the land labor ratio, agricultural 
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assets, non-agricultural assets, participation in the off-farm labor 
market, land rental market imperfection and off-farm labor market 
imperfection all have significant impacts on farm household 
decisions concerning the participation in the land rental market. 
But all these factors work differently for tenants and for landlords. 
Changes in these variables will promote the participation of one 
side of the land rental market, while restraining another side from 
participating. 
 
One of the consequences of these observed processes could be 
land concentration in agricultural production, not only in the hand 
of farmers, but also in the hand of agricultural enterprises. But 
these two groups of actors have their own difficulties in renting 
land. Financial market constraints and output market volatility can 
be obstacles for small farm households to rent (most Chinese 
farm households are initially small). For agricultural enterprises, 
transaction costs in dealing with an enormous amount of small 
farm households could be the major challenge. 
 
Finally we would like to emphasize the importance of linkage 
between the land rental market and the off-farm labor market. As 
we already know from the above empirical study, the participation 
rate of rural labor in the off-farm work and off-farm labor market 
imperfection have a significant impact on the probability of 
participation in the land rental market and on the predicted renting 
area of farm households. A well-functioning land rental market 
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cannot be developed without a well-functioning off-farm labor 
market. Thus, further reforms which intend to improve the 
performance of the land rental market should not only focus on 
the market itself, but also on the related off-farm labor market. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
In November 2013, the Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese 
Communist Party Congress convened. On this occasion, the 
party announced several reform plans which included assigning 
more property rights to famers. However, land ownership was still 
not mentioned. This reluctance is not necessarily surprising, 
given that many local governments in China are heavily indebted 
and rely on land as their major source of revenue. 
 
Although only the use right of land is in the hand of farmers, the 
land rental market can be developed. How does such a land 
rental market affect the rural economic development? 
 
From a historical perspective, the relationship between the land 
rental market and agricultural productivity is obscure. The 
emergence and spread of permanent tenancy might increase the 
incentives for tenants to decide for long-term investments in land, 
but at the same time decrease the incentives for landlords to 
invest. Data pertaining to the provincial level data during the 
period of the Republic of China may demonstrate a positive 
correlation between agricultural productivity and share of land 
rental, but we cannot be certain about it unless we can control 
other possible factors which may affect contemporary productivity 
and land rental participation. 
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With free access to the land rental market in the Republic of 
China, the land rental market was not benefitting the poor as land 
was transferred from small stakeholders to larger stakeholders. 
This reminds us of the importance of developing a well-
functioning rural credit market and insurance market which can 
smooth consumption fluctuation of poor farmers and enable them 
get loans for production. But as we have discussed in chapter 2, 
whether poor farm households gain or lose from renting out land 
depends on whether land can be evaluated correctly and whether 
they rent out land due to shift of occupation from agriculture to 
non-agricultural sectors. 
 
As discussed in chapter 3 the farm household model is the basic 
tool enabling us to study the impact of decisions pertaining to 
land rental market participation, agricultural productivity and 
income distribution, as well as factors affecting market 
participation. To investigate the impact of land rental market 
participation on agricultural productivity, we developed two 
alternative hypotheses: participation in the land rental market can 
improve agricultural productivity by transferring land from less 
efficient farmers to more efficient farmers; participation in the land 
rental market may also impair the agricultural productivity due to 
more efficient farmers renting out land in order to work off-farm. 
But the overall welfare may as well be improved by more efficient 
use of labor. Examining the land rental market and income 
distribution, we have emphasized the income diversifying effect of 
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off-farm labor market participation and land rental market 
incompleteness on income inequality. In the analysis of factors 
affecting land rental market participation, off-farm labor market 
participation is the primary concern. Furthermore, we have 
discussed the endogenous relationship between agricultural 
productivity and evolvement of the land rental market and its 
implication for empirical analysis. 
 
Building upon this theoretical approach, this study has provided a 
quantitative analysis using data from rural Chongqing. Our study 
shows that participating in the land rental market does lead to 
improvements of land use efficiency by transferring land from less 
efficient farm households to more efficient farm households. But 
market informational asymmetry, opportunism, and transaction 
costs may prevent the land rental market to fully realize its 
potential in promoting land use efficiency given that a significant 
share of efficient farm households are stay outside the market. In 
terms of production efficiency for a specific farm household, 
participation in the land rental market has not significant impact 
on the efficiency level of farm households. This may suggest that 
in a less competitive land rental market where most explicit land 
rents are zero, incentives for farm households to improve their 
farm management level are low. 
 
We found that some of the more efficient farm households indeed 
rent out land and engage in off-farm work, but the share of this 
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kind of farm households is small. It may suggest that both 
hypotheses are true. However, more efficient farm households 
are more likely to rent land instead of renting land out, which 
strongly indicates an efficiency enhancing effect of the land rental 
market. 
 
In the analysis of the land rental market and income inequality, 
we show that contribution of income from land rental activities to 
overall income inequality has grown over time and participation in 
the land rental market also raises income inequality, presuming 
an incomplete land rental market. As more farm households leave 
the agricultural market and join the off-farm labor market, 
distributional effects of the land rental market generates bias; the 
imperfect land rental market creates “winners” and “losers” due to 
marginal returns to land is significantly higher than observed land 
rent.  
 
Overall, the land rental market has a positive effect on land use 
efficiency, but the incomplete market environment impedes 
releasing the potential of the land rental market and contaminates 
the distribution effect of the land rental market. 
 
Regarding factors that impact land rental market participation, we 
discovered an equalization effect of the land rental market on the 
distribution of land, but its most pronounced influence pertains to 
the off-farm labor market. So as changes in off farm work market, 
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we expect that farm households are more likely to rent out land 
and less likely to rent in land, which lead to a low equilibrium land 
rent in a closed economy.  
 
Therefore, to release the potential of the land rental market in 
promote agricultural production efficiency, to reverse the effect of 
the land rental participation on income distribution, and to avoid 
inefficient use of land, policies should focus on the following 
aspects: 
 
We suggest that informational asymmetry might be the reason 
why some of the more efficient farm households refrained from 
land rental market. So policies should be interested in reduce 
informational asymmetry. Enactment of Rural Land Contract Law 
is a good start, but this law is not well enforced. In spite of Rural 
Land Contract Law requires that a land rental transaction should 
call for a written contract, oral contract still dominating in the area 
of research. A written contract of land rental transaction could 
assign the rights and liabilities between landlord and tenant, 
therefore an enforceable written contract should reduce 
informational asymmetry. Therefore government should 
strengthen the implementation of Rural Land Contract Law.  
 
Another source of informational asymmetry might be inconvenient 
accessibility of land rental information. That might be the reason 
why most land rental partners are acquaintances in the area of 
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research. Given the development of information technology, the 
accessibility of information has greatly improved. Spread land 
rental information through internet could be an efficiency way to 
increase accessibility to land rental market. But for rural people it 
might be difficult to get the resource to access to internet, and 
hence, to the information of land rental. So it might be more 
applicable to find someone to be the intermediary between 
potential landlord and tenant. In this case, village cadres could be 
a candidate.  
 
We mentioned that risks from off farm labor market might be a 
reason why oral contract be preferred. Therefore, policies intend 
to reduce information asymmetry should also focus on reform in 
off farm labor market. The reform should include registering 
migrated laborers in the cities they moved in and enjoy the social 
security system. So the incentive of migrated landlord to make 
informal contract can be reduced. However, this suggestion might 
be unpractical for two reasons. One is that the registered 
residents of the city may fear that this reform can compromise 
their social welfare. Or the city’s government may against this 
reform for it increase the financial burden to the city.  
 
It is also important to improve the tenure security for farm 
households. Even though we said farm households in China 
enjoy a relatively secure land use right, it is not total secure, 
mainly because of government expropriation. As long as 
 144 
 
government has the exclusive right to change land use type, 
attempts to restrict government appropriation could be useless. 
Without a doubt, deprive this exclusive right of government is a 
big challenge. But increase the compensation to farmers who 
land was expropriated could be an effective way to reduce 
government incentive to expropriate land, because it reduce the 
revenue government can obtain from land appropriation.  
 
Is land privatization going to be an option of reforms? Like we 
discussed previously, it depends on the reforms in other area. For 
example, build a fully covered social security system so that land 
no longer needs to be used as a social security system; reform 
agricultural input and output markets and rural credit system so 
that land can be correctly evaluated and monetized; rural 
insurances market also need to be reformed so that farmers can 
avoid selling land due to unexpected shocks, and so on. If land 
privatization was included in the bundle of reforms, it should not 
be implemented unless other reforms have been implemented.  
 
Future researches can be extended to the following points. Firstly, 
from the estimation of efficiency function we find that farm size is 
positively correlated with technical efficiency level of farm 
households. But the relation between farm size and productivity 
still unclear, for technical efficiency only account for a part of 
productivity. Then further research should be extended to identify 
whether there is an “inverse relationship” between farm size and 
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productivity. We predict that as development of land rental market 
and off farm labor market, farm size will increase. So it is 
significant to find out the effect of increase in farm size.  
 
Secondly, in China government officers’ promotion is closely 
related to economic growth of the region they governed (Xu and 
Wang, 2010). This promotion mechanism provides strong 
incentive for local government to expropriate agricultural land for 
development (Zhang et al., 2011). It will be interesting to look into 
the economic growth if government give up its exclusive rights to 
change land use type and how this going to affect poorer.  
 
Finally, in stochastic frontier analysis, we use two step 
procedures to estimate stochastic frontier production function and 
efficiency function separately in order to keep the assumption that 
technical efficiency consist of persistent part and time varying part. 
Further studies should investigate how to maintain this 
assumption and avoid estimation bias due to two step procedures 
in the meantime.  
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Appendix 
Appendix I: Bayesian inference of stochastic frontier model 
1. The likelihood function 
 
A stochastic production frontier includes time variant and invariant 
technical inefficiency can be represented as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝜷) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖              (A1) 
𝛼𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛼
2) 
𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝐺(1, 𝜂𝑡) 
𝑧𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑. 𝐺(1, 𝛾) 
where  𝛼𝑖(𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁)  represents firm effect, 𝑣𝑖𝑡  denotes 
stochastic error which contain measurement error and external 
shocks, 𝑧𝑖  denotes persistent inefficiency of firm 𝑖  and has a 
gamma distribution with parameter 𝛾 , and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is time varying 
inefficiency of firm 𝑖 and has a gamma distribution at time 𝑡 with 
parameter 𝜂𝑡. We assume these distributions independent of one 
another. This is the generalized true random effect model (GTRE) 
specified in Tsionas and Kumbhakar (2012), whereas we consider 
different distribution assumption about inefficiency terms. That is 
we assume the inefficiency terms were distributed exponentially, 
because exponential distribution assumption about the one side 
error was proved to be stable to prior change (van den Broeck, et 
al., 1994).  
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To improve the efficiency of exploration of conditional posterior 
distribution of Gibbs sampler, Tsionas and Kumbhakar (2012) 
developed two re-parameterizations
24
. In this study we follow their 
𝜉 -Parametrization which is to denote 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 , then 
𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2) , where 𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝜎𝑣
2 + 𝜎𝛼
2 . Let ℎ = 1 𝜎𝜀
2⁄ , then 
𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 1 ℎ⁄ ).   
 
Then we have the stochastic frontier production function of the 
form: 
𝒚𝒊 = 𝑓(𝒙𝒊; 𝜷) + 𝜺𝒊 − 𝒖𝑖 − 𝑧𝑖𝜾𝑇 
where 𝒚𝒊 = (𝑦𝑖,𝑡=𝑇 , … , 𝑦𝑖,𝑡=𝑇)
′ , and 𝜺𝒊 = (𝜀𝑖,𝑡=1, … , 𝜀𝑖,𝑡=𝑇)
′  implying  
𝜺𝒊  has a multivariate normal distribution with mean 𝟎𝑻 and 
covariance matrix ℎ−1𝐼𝑇. 𝒖𝑖 = (𝑢𝑖,𝑡=𝑇 , … , 𝑢𝑖,𝑡=𝑇)
′, and 𝜾𝑇 is a 1 × T 
vector of 1. The likelihood function is given by 
p(𝑦|𝛽, 𝑋, ℎ, 𝑢, 𝑧) = ∏ (
ℎ
2𝜋
)
𝑇
2
{𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−
ℎ
2
(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝛽) + 𝑢𝑖 +
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑧𝑖𝜄𝑇)
′(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑓(𝑥𝑖; 𝛽) + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖𝜄𝑇)]}                                                (A2) 
      
2. The hierarchical prior 
 
For the inefficiencies, we use a hierarchical prior. As we already 
shown in equation (1), 𝑢𝑖𝑡  and 𝑧𝑖  are assumed to have an 
exponential distribution. The hierarchical prior implies that we 
                                                             
24αiand zi are both time invariant, therefore in MCMC scheme it’s hard to 
distinguish αi and zi because they are correlated. Re-parameterization was 
used to group correlated variables and remove this correlation in MCMC 
process (refer toTsionas and Kumbhakar (2012) for detail). 
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trate 𝜂𝑡and𝛾 as parameters which need their own priors. Because 
in exponential distribution the parameters 𝜂𝑡 and 𝛾 are supposed 
to be positive, we assume a two parameter Gamma distribution 
for 𝜂𝑡 and 𝛾 repectively,  
𝛾~𝐺(𝑐, 𝑝) 
𝜂𝑡~𝐺 (𝑓𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡) , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
where 𝑐  and 𝑓𝑡  are shape parameters and 𝑝  and 𝑟𝑡  are rate 
parameters. The values of these hyper-parameters are 
determined by researchers before estimation which reflect prior 
information about parameters and can be determined by 
considering efficiency distribution.  
 
The prior assumption of 𝜷 should incorporate regularity conditions: 
homogeneity, monotonicity and concavity. Without prior 
information about monotonicity and concavity, we use a non-
informative prior for 𝜷: 
𝜷~1(𝜷 ∈ 𝑀) 
where 1(𝜷 ∈ 𝑀) is an indicator function equals 1 if the parameter 
vector 𝜷 in the set defined by monotonic and concave conditions 
or 0 otherwise. Note that we have implemented homogenous 
condition by normalization.  
 
For the parameter error precision ℎ  we assume it has a two 
parameter Gamma prior: 
ℎ~𝐺(𝑠, 𝑞) 
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where 𝑠 is shape parameter and 𝑞 is rate parameter. 
3. The posterior density function 
 
By using Bayes’ rule, the full posterior density distribution with 
data augmentation is given by 
𝑝(𝜷, ℎ, 𝒖, 𝒛, 𝛾, 𝜼|𝑦, 𝑿)
∝ [∏ 𝑝(𝒚𝒊|𝜷, 𝑿𝒊, ℎ, 𝒖𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖)𝑝(𝒖𝒊|1, 𝜼)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑝(𝑧𝑖|1, 𝛾)] 𝑝(𝛾)𝑝(𝜷)𝑝(ℎ) ∏ 𝑝(𝜂𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
More explicitly,  
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i i i iβ u z η X y X β u ι y X β u ι
β
 
Our Bayesian posterior inference is based on Metropolis-within-
Gibbs sampling with data augmentation. All we need to do is to 
formulate the full posterior conditional distributions. 
 
For the parameter in translog production function, we get 
𝜷|ℎ, 𝒖, 𝒛, 𝛾, 𝜼~𝑵(𝜷, 𝑽)1(𝜷 ∈ 𝑀)                                                  (A3) 
where 
𝑽 = (ℎ ∑ 𝑿𝑖
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑿𝑖)
−1
 
and 
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𝜷 = (∑ 𝑿𝑖
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑿𝑖)
−1
(∑ 𝑿𝑖
′
𝑁
𝑖=1
[𝒚𝒊 + 𝒖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖𝜾𝑇]) 
For the error precision h, we have 
ℎ|𝜷, 𝒖, 𝒛, 𝛾, 𝜼~𝐺(𝑠, 𝑞)                                                                  (A4) 
where 
𝑠 =
𝑁𝑇
2
+ 𝑠 
and 
𝑞 =
∑ (𝒚𝒊 − 𝑿𝒊𝜷 + 𝒖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖𝜾𝑇)
′(𝒚𝒊 − 𝑿𝒊𝜷 + 𝒖𝑖 + 𝑧𝑖𝜾𝑇)
𝑁
𝑖=1
2
+ 𝑞 
 
The conditional posterior distribution for 𝒖𝑖 , the time varying 
inefficiencies, are independent random vectors for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗; 𝑖, 𝑗 =
1, … , 𝑁, its posterior p.d.f given by 
𝑝(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜷, ℎ, 𝒛, 𝛾, 𝜼) ∝ 𝑓𝑁(𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑧𝑖 − 𝜂𝑡 ℎ⁄ , 1 ℎ⁄ )1(𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0)    (A5) 
where1(𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0) is an indicator function equals to 1 if 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0 is 
satisfied and 0 otherwise. 
 
The conditional posterior distribution of 𝑧𝑖 , with independent 
assumption for 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗(𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑁), has the truncated normal form 
𝑝(𝑧𝑖|𝜷, ℎ, 𝒖, 𝒛−𝑖 , 𝛾, 𝜼) ∝ 𝑓𝑁(𝑋𝑖𝛽 − 𝑦𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 − 𝛾 𝑇ℎ⁄ , 1 𝑇ℎ⁄ )1(𝑧𝑖 ≥ 0)  
(A6) 
where 1(𝑧𝑖 ≥ 0)  is an indicator function equals to 1 if 𝑧𝑖 ≥ 0 is 
satisfied and 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖is a 1 × 𝑘 vector which containing the 
average value of each independent variable for individual 𝑖 , 
𝑢𝑖 = 𝑇
−1 ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  and 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑇
−1 ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 .  
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The posterior conditional distribution of 𝛾 has a Gamma form 
𝑝(𝛾|𝜷, ℎ, 𝜽, 𝒛, 𝛾, 𝜼)~𝐺(𝑐, 𝑝)                                                          (A7) 
where 
𝑐 = 𝑁 + 𝑐 
and 
𝑝 = ∑ 𝑧𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
+ 𝑝 
 
The posterior conditional distribution of 𝜂𝑡 is given by 
𝑝(𝜂𝑡|𝜷, ℎ, 𝜽, 𝒛, 𝛼, 𝛾, 𝝀) ∝ 𝐺(𝑓𝑡, 𝑟𝑡)                                                 (A8) 
where 
𝑓
𝑡
= 𝑁 + 𝑓𝑡 
and 
𝑟𝑡 = ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
4. Bayesian Computation 
 
Drawing random sample from the conditional posterior 
distributions of parameter ℎ , 𝛾 , and 𝜂𝑡(𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇)  is 
straightforward. While the conditional posterior distributions of 𝜷, 
𝒖𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁), and 𝑧𝑖 do not have a standard form and need 
different sampling strategy.  
To generating random draws from the posterior conditional 
distribution of 𝒖𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖, we use random walk Metropolis-Hastings 
algorithm. Multivariate normal distribution for 𝒖𝑖 and normal 
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distribution for 𝑧𝑖were employed as candidate generating density. 
We adjust the covariance of multivariate normal distribution and 
the variance of normal distribution to make sure the acceptance 
probability in the range of 0.23-0.45 (Roberts et al., 1997).  
 
The way we used to impose curvature conditions on stochastic 
frontier production function is independent Chain Metropolis and 
Hastings algorithm. To implement this procedure we need to find 
an appropriate candidate generating density. Here cross entropy 
can be employed to do that job. In the first step, we estimate the 
stochastic frontier without constraints by using Metropolis within 
Gibbs sampler (Metropolis-Hastings algorithm was used to infer 
the conditional density distribution of inefficiency terms). We get 
the posterior density function of function parameters. The 
algorithm used by Terrell (1996) to impose curvature conditions is 
based on this posterior density function of function parameters to 
find out the parameter vectors which satisfy monotonicity can 
concavity. As noted by O’Donnell and Coelli (2005), Terrell’s 
algorithm was inefficiency to generate a qualified parameter 
vector. This is true especially when the parameter vectors which 
satisfy curvature conditions only account for a very small 
proportion of the whole distribution. Then it takes time to generate 
a qualified draw. In this case cross entropy (CE) method can be 
used to explore this “rare event” and improve the efficiency of 
posterior inference. CE method is an adaptive algorithm and can 
be used to simulate rare event (de Boer, et al., 2005). In the 
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second step, CE method was used to simulate the properties 
(mean and covariance) of parameters which fulfill curvature 
conditions. Then we can formulate an appropriate candidate 
generating density by using these properties. Finally, we re-
estimate the function’s parameters by using Metropolis within 
Gibbs sampler in which inference of posterior conditional density 
of 𝜷  is based on independence chain Metropolis-Hastings 
algorithm using the candidate generating density we obtained in 
step two. After we draw a random parameter vector from 
candidate generating density we calculate an acceptance 
probability and accept this draw randomly.  
 
There is no specific information about the extent of inefficiency in 
rural Chongqing. We assume a 40% output loss due to technical 
inefficiency. And we assume time varying technical inefficiency 
and time persistent technical inefficiency contribute equally to the 
total inefficiency level, which imply 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0.2, and 𝐸(𝑧𝑖) = 0.2. 
For 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝑧𝑖 both have a gamma distribution. We can obtain that 
1
𝛾
= 0.2, and 
1
𝜂𝑡
= 0.2. Apparently, 𝛾 = 5, and 𝜂𝑡 = 5, for 𝑡 = 1, … ,7. 
Then we have E(γ) =
c
p
= 5 . Set c = 1 and p = 0.2 . Inference 
about 𝑓𝑡 and 𝑟𝑡 are the same, and we 𝑓𝑡 = 1and 𝑟𝑡 = 0.2. For the 
hyper-parameters of ℎ , we set s = 1  and q = 100 , which is 
relatively non-informative about the distribution of ℎ.  
 
In practice, we use MATLAB to implement the Bayesian inference 
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described above. We take 70,000 iterations and discard the first 
20,000 draw as burn-in. We use Monte-Carlo integration to infer 
the posterior mean of each parameters and 90% highest 
probability interval. The convergence of each algorithm was 
checked by using the method suggested by Geweke (1992).  
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Appendix Table 1 Comparing family size of different type of 
farm household, 2010 
 
rent out no rent rent in 
Mean family size 3,22* 3,68* 4,75* 
Standard error 1,26 1,43 1,34 
Note: * means the differences of group mean are significant at 
5% level.  
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Appendix Table 2 Land rental contract forms in China, 1936 
Province 
Fixed cash contract Fixed graincontract Sharecropping Others Total 
No. obs % No. obs % No. obs % No.obs % No. obs % 
Jiangsu 26,639 47.54 23,054 41.13 6,171 11.01 178 0.32 56,033 100.00 
Zhejiang 14,047 33.96 26,330 63.54 1,036 2.50 - - 41,439 100.00 
Anhui 6,607 14.44 30,722 67.13 8,428 18.41 9 0.02 45,766 100.00 
Jiangxi 241 92.42 3,937 5.68 81 1.90 - - 4,259 100.00 
Hunan 5,032 9.30 38,898 71.93 9,967 18.43 186 0.34 54,083 100.00 
Hubei 6,514 18.50 14,537 76.51 943 4.96 5 0.03 18,999 100.00 
Hebei 6,107 62.62 1,719 17.62 1,912 17.01 4 0.05 9,752 100.00 
Shandong 2,676 22.14 4,420 36.58 4,988 41.28 - - 12,084 100.00 
Henan 996 8.81 2,152 19.02 8,137 71.94 26 0.23 11,311 100.00 
Shanxi 11 7.86 69 49.28 60 42.86 - - 140 100.00 
Shaanxi 969 13.81 5,626 80.16 424 6.03 - - 7,019 100.00 
Chahaer - - 23 47.92 25 52.08 - - 48 100.00 
Suiyuan 39 92.85 3 7.15 - - - - 42 100.00 
Fujian 2,594 16.03 12,210 75.45 1,379 8.52 - - 16,183 100.00 
Guangdong 1,345 15.34 7,416 84.60 2 0.02 3 0.04 8,766 100.00 
Guangxi 207 7.94 2,020 77.52 378 14.50 1 0.04 2,606 100.00 
Total 71,050 24.62 
173,12
7 
60.01 43,941 15.23 412 0.14 288,530 100.00 
Data source: Outline of National Land Survey, edited by Land Committee of Republic of China, 1936. 
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Appendix Table 3 Length of land rental contract in China, 1936 
Province No. obs 
Permanent 
Tenancy 
Fixed length 
Contract 
Length flexible 
Contact 
Others 
  
No. obs % No. obs % No. obs % No. obs % 
Jiangsu 54,544 22,284 40.86 5,009 9.18 27,251 49.96 - - 
Zhejiang 39,277 12,000 30.59 3,972 10.13 23,096 58.88 159 0.4 
Anhui 43,012 18,990 44.15 5,536 12.87 18,482 42.97 4 0.01 
Jiangxi 4,139 96 2.29 13 0.31 4,084 97.4 - - 
Hunan 56,100 566 1 263 0.41 55,270 98.52 1 0.01 
Hubei 17,354 2,326 13.4 792 4.57 14,236 82.03 - - 
Hebei 9,726 383 3.94 2,281 23.45 7,062 72.61 - - 
Shandong 11,845 530 4.47 663 5.6 10,652 89.93 - - 
Henan 11,389 292 2.56 884 7.76 10,211 89.66 2 0.02 
Shanxi 144 6 4.17 60 41.67 78 54.16 - - 
Shaanxi 6,879 36 0.52 194 2.82 6,649 96.66 - - 
Chahaer 122 96 78.69 5 4.1 21 17.21 - - 
Suiyuan 564 530 93.97 22 3.9 12 2.13 - - 
Fujian 14,967 776 5.18 1,294 8.65 12,897 86.17 - - 
Guangdong 8,971 151 1.68 1,386 17.66 7,236 80.66 - - 
Guangxi 2,651 311 11.73 302 11.39 2,036 76.8 2 0.08 
Total 281,488 39,373 21.08 22,874 8.12 199,073 70.74 168 0.06 
Data source: Outline of National Land Survey, edited by Land Committee of Republic of China, 1936. 
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Appendix Table 4 Description of data used in technical efficiency analysis 
 
Tianba Changshui Xiehe overall 
 
mean std mean std mean std mean std 
Stochastic production frontier 
     
output(Yuan) 1355.41  1199.29  2333.41  1593.80  7074.75  8132.45  2612.99  3890.37  
capital(Yuan) 191.82  628.51  672.12  1002.36  745.88  954.85  472.74  885.61  
sown area(mu) 3.13  2.78  6.63  4.76  7.98  3.61  5.31  4.29  
labor(days) 78.16  90.71  246.57  144.29  253.68  206.25  174.17  160.09  
inter(Yuan) 407.56  362.84  686.78  485.47  1289.74  955.96  654.79  614.06  
         
Efficiency function 
      
participation rate(%) 0.01  0.08  0.10  0.21  0.24  0.27  0.08  0.19  
household head age 53.79  11.07  52.58  24.99  51.08  10.14  52.88  18.11  
herfindal index 0.14  0.13  0.28  0.17  0.43  0.21  0.24  0.19  
plots 3.89  3.76  3.14  1.86  12.05  4.64  4.80  4.48  
Machinery (%) 0.48  0.50  0.09  0.28  0.04  0.19  0.25  0.43  
farm size (mu) 1.54  1.18  2.94  2.66  6.33  3.16  2.83  2.75  
Data source: RCRE. Note: all monetary values were deflated into the price level of 2003.  
 
